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ABSTRACT 
We should no longer expect the Alien Tort Statute to be the principal 
federal statute that deters overseas corporate rights violations. That 
distinction rightly belongs to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, an anti-
bribery statute that rests on undisputed principles of corporate liability, 
contains a clear congressional statement of extraterritorial application, 
and routinely collects penalties from multinational corporate defendants. 
Scholars have not associated the FCPA with human rights, owing 
principally to a thin understanding of rights theory. But freedom from 
corruption can and should be understood as a human right, one that is as 
old as social contract theory but new to federal and international law. 
With specific reforms—one modeled after environmental law and the other 
after intellectual property—the FCPA can become a more powerful 
statutory tool for deterring overseas corporate rights violations than the 
ATS ever was or will be.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The Supreme Court is thought to have dealt a near-fatal blow to the 
doctrine of corporate liability for overseas human rights violations. Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
1
 limited the extraterritorial application of 
the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) almost to the point of nonexistence. 
Because the ATS is (or was) widely regarded as the sole provision of the 
U.S. Code holding corporations liable for overseas rights abuses, we 
assume the doctrine now lies on its deathbed.  
But the ATS may not have been particularly well-suited to protect 
human rights from overseas corporate intrusions. The 225-year-old, one-
 
 
 1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/5
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sentence statute contains no express grant of extraterritorial application.
2
 
Neither does it provide for the liability of corporations.
3
 And its capacity 
to deter violations has been greatly hampered by the near impossibility of 
collecting corporate judgments.
4
 As the cornerstone of a federal statutory 
regime, the ATS was rather precarious. Perhaps we should not be 
surprised to now bemoan its fate.  
What the world needs now is a federal statute that holds both U.S. and 
foreign companies liable for overseas human rights abuses; a statute that 
contains an express congressional statement of extraterritorial application 
and rests on well-established principles of corporate liability. Ideally, the 
statute would plainly provide a specific cause of action, amply supported 
by an accessible legislative history. It would not have the courts 
unilaterally intervening in delicate foreign affairs, but would involve the 
executive branch in enforcement. And in the best of all possible worlds, its 
settlements would be consistently won and collected, inducing an 
international culture of compliance. What we need, in other words, is a 
statute that does the work the ATS never could and, after Kiobel, likely 
never will. 
That statute already exists. It is the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”), which criminalizes the bribery of overseas officials for 
business purposes.
5
 Congress originally enacted this statute in 1977 
specifically to promote democratic values across the world through 
international business.
6
 The FCPA recently accounted for half of all 
criminal penalties collected by the U.S. Department of Justice.
7
 Indeed, 
that agency has publicly stated that after fighting terrorism, combating 
overseas corporate bribery is its first priority.
8
  
 
 
 2. The full text of the ATS reads, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). For a discussion of extraterritoriality, see, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, 
Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815 (2009) (discussing the 
debate). 
 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 4. See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of 
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709 (2012) (reviewing the challenges ATS plaintiffs face in 
collecting judgments against corporate defendants). 
 5. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3 (2012). 
 6. See infra Part I.A. 
 7. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Secures More than $2 Billion in 
Judgments and Settlements as a Result of Enforcement Actions Led by the Criminal Division (Jan. 21, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-crm-085.html.  
 8. Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition 
Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 247, 249–50 (2010). 
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Still, anti-bribery law is not generally thought of in relation to the 
broader movement to hold corporations accountable for human rights 
violations, for two reasons. The first is an impoverished understanding of 
rights. While we may consider corruption to be a means of violating 
human rights, we do not generally regard it as an inherent rights violation.
9
 
Secondly, we enforce, and regard, overseas corporate bribery as essentially 
an issue of white-collar crime. This owes to a historical accident whereby 
Congress codified the bribery prohibition as an amendment to the 1934 
Exchange Act, vesting enforcement authority with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.
10
 We thus enforce a prohibition on corrupting 
foreign governments as if that conduct were really no different than 
domestic insider trading or market manipulation.  
But history is proving circular, and we must now rediscover that which 
we once understood all too well. Corruption does indeed violate a human 
right: the right to a liberty that can be realized only in civil society, where 
the government confers benefits in accordance with standing laws, 
common to everyone, and directed to the public good.
11
 In Lockean 
political theory, it is the right to not be under “the arbitrary will of 
another.”12 The violation of this right voids the social contract, destroys 
civil society, and returns humankind to the state of nature. Indeed, Locke 
claimed that abusing public office for private gain was the very definition 
of tyranny.
13
  
So too is corporate bribery closely associated with other rights already 
recognized in international law: the right to equal protection, to political 
representation, to self-determination, to food, housing, and medical care, 
to education, to equal access to a country’s public services, to safe 
working conditions, to control natural resources, and indeed to the very 
rule of law itself.
14
 Corruption, properly defined, is the source from which 
so many other violations spring. 
The starting point for reframing federal corruption policy lies in a 
recent policy paper of the Obama Administration. In 2010, the 
Administration publicly claimed that “corruption is a violation of basic 
 
 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 34 (Prometheus Books ed. 
1986). 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/5
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human rights.”15 The paper was both underpublicized, and undertheorized; 
it did little to promote or defend this assertion. But when subjected to a 
rigorous philosophical defense, this executive statement of foreign policy 
can begin to fill the void that the judicial branch’s Kiobel decision has 
created. 
Meanwhile, the catalyst for a broad public debate on anti-bribery 
policy lies in a now-pending FCPA enforcement action that should prove 
the highest-profile in history: Wal-Mart, perhaps the most infamous U.S.-
based multinational corporation, is under investigation for systematically 
paying bribes across the developing world, inducing violations of various 
long-recognized rights.
16
 With the convergence of these forces, now is the 
time to reconceptualize corporate bribery as an issue of human rights.  
This Article undertakes that project, making three claims. First, 
corruption generally, and bribery specifically, can and must be regarded as 
violating a human right. Second, once the FCPA is understood as a human 
rights statute, it provides a far more effective model for deterring overseas 
rights abuses by corporations than the ATS ever did, or could. Third, with 
two specific reforms modeled after other areas of federal law, we could 
more fully achieve the FCPA’s purpose of promoting human rights 
through international business. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I demonstrates that the FCPA 
was, at its inception, understood as a statute for promoting democratic 
values in developing countries through ethical commerce. It then provides 
empirical data which show that enforcement now creates the conditions in 
which bribery proliferates: enforcement deters investment in countries 
perceived to be corrupt, leaving a foreign direct investment void which is 
filled by aggressive bribe-payors from nondemocratic jurisdictions. I have 
previously called this dynamic the sanctioning effect of anti-bribery law.
17
 
Part II first provides a new definition of corruption that is suitable to the 
era of anti-bribery enforcement, then demonstrates that corruption, 
properly defined, can and indeed must be regarded as violating a right. 
Having reframed bribery as a human rights issue, Part III explains how the 
FCPA provides a far surer foundation on which to build a federal statutory 
regime of corporate liability for overseas rights violations than the ATS 
 
 
 15. THE WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 38 (2010), available at http://www.white 
house.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf [hereinafter OBAMA REPORT]. 
 16. See infra Part II.C. 
 17. See Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law: U.S. Progressivism 
and China’s New Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA L. REV. 354 (2011); Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting 
Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions against Emerging Markets, 
62 FLA. L. REV. 351 (2010).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ever could. It proposes two specific reforms, the first based on 
environmental law and the second on intellectual property law, to more 
fully achieve anti-bribery’s original purpose. Corporate liability for human 
rights violations is thus a legal principle that must lose its life to find it: 
with its imminent death in the ATS, it can find new life in the FCPA.I. 
Anti-Bribery’s Paradox: The Foreign Policy Problem with a White-Collar 
Crime Solution 
At its inception, Congress understood the FCPA as an instrument for 
promoting democratic values in developing countries. As this Part will 
show, that vision was deeply shaped by the historical context of the Cold 
War. But with the collapse of Soviet Union, we ceased to see the world 
through that lens, and the foreign policy implications of anti-bribery law 
gradually grew obscure. The goal of promoting democracy would be 
displaced with “leveling the playing field,” a metaphor that pervades 
congressional testimony of the 1980s and 90s
18
 and popular commentary 
of the last decade.
19
 The metaphor goes only to the FCPA’s anti-
competitive effects on U.S. companies, tellingly capturing the limitations 
of our present anti-bribery paradigm. If business is a game and 
multinational companies are the players, what then are the developing 
countries in which they do business? The spectators? Or the turf? The 
original understanding of anti-bribery’s aims is sorely in need of recovery. 
Part I.A recounts the legislative history surrounding the FCPA’s 
enactment, showing that those who testified understood the statute as an 
instrument of promoting democratic values overseas. Part I.B draws on 
several sources of empirical data to show that our modern white-collar 
crime enforcement regime is actually causing compliant companies to 
withdraw from developing countries and, moreover, leads companies from 
countries that do not enforce anti-bribery laws to move in and fill the void. 
Part I.C illustrates how reframing bribery as a human rights violation can 
realign enforcement with the statute’s original purpose.  
 
 
 18. See Andrew Brady Spalding, Four Unchartered Corners of Anti-Corruption Law: In Search 
of Remedies to the Sanctioning Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 661, 662. 
 19. See, e.g., ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 
(2010), available at http://www.uschamber.com/reports/restoring-balance-proposed-amendments-
foreign-corrupt-practices-act.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/5
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A. The FCPA’s Original Ideal of Spreading Democracy Through 
Commerce 
Congressional deliberations on the need for an extraterritorial anti-
bribery statute in the 1970s were initially precipitated by the discovery that 
the Lockheed Corporation, the flagship U.S. defense contractor, had paid 
bribes to government officials in Japan, the Netherlands, and Italy to win 
bids.
20
 Each of these countries was thought critical to the growth of 
democratic institutions, and revelations of corporate bribery undermined 
liberalism’s credibility. 
Perhaps the most sophisticated and telling explanation of international 
bribery’s foreign policy implications was provided by Congressman 
Stephen Solarz, a Democrat from New York. In 1976, he testified before 
Congress, “It is important to look at the problem of overseas payments in 
broader terms than simply a matter of economics or even morality.”21 
Solarz’s view that an additional dimension to the problem of overseas 
bribery existed would prove to be a universal and predominant theme in 
the congressional testimony. Solarz explained that Lockheed’s payments 
to Japanese officials put “‘[t]he democratic system in Japan . . . in grave 
danger.’”22 Opponents within Japan of the Japanese-U.S. alliance were 
handed what he called: 
a terribly effective weapon to drive a wedge between two close 
allies. At a time of uncertainty due to the shifting balances of power 
in Asia, our strongest and most stable ally in the region [was] 
undergoing unnecessary turbulence, and [a] relationship which is at 
the very heart of our foreign policy [was] potentially jeopardized.
23
 
Solarz thought the “most serious” and “delicate” situation was in Italy, 
which was “one of the keys to the southern flank of NATO” and whose 
government was equally split between a liberal party and the Communist 
 
 
 20. See WILLIAM D. HARTUNG, PROPHETS OF WAR: LOCKHEED MARTIN AND THE MAKING OF 
THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 189, 192 (2011). 
 21. Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. 
of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 140 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 House 
Consumer Prot. Subcomm. Hearing] (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz). 
 22. Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 172 (1977) 
[hereinafter 1977 Prot. Hearings] (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz) (quoting “a very senior 
politician close to former [Japanese] Prime Minister Takeo Mike”).  
 23. 1976 House Consumer Prot. Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 21, at 141 (statement of Rep. 
Stephen J. Solarz). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Party.
24
 He noted that “[a]llegations of payments by Lockheed served to 
advance the Communist cause in Italy where the Communist bloc was 
strengthened by the sight of corrupt capitalism.”25  
Congress feared that the Communist Party could gain a majority in the 
Italian parliament and the prospects for building democratic institutions 
would be lost.
26
 The implications of corporate bribery for the U.S. effort to 
promote the growth of democratic institutions were thus “staggering and 
in some cases, perhaps irreversible.”27 The example of Italy demonstrated 
that “[c]ommunist and other anti-U.S. forces are quick to take advantage 
of any evidence of immorality or corruption associated with pro-Western 
governments. Both fear and resentment are generated among foreign 
officials who become increasingly hostile as the United States continues to 
expose traditional corrupt practices abroad.”28 Solarz continued, “[W]hat 
is at stake is much more than the individual interests of corporations which 
are competing for a share of foreign markets. What is in fact at stake is the 
foreign policy and national interest of the United States.”29 Ultimately, 
“The resulting economic and political instability is certainly detrimental 
. . . when it results in a backlash against American ideals . . . .”30  
This seemingly hawkish view would actually prove non-partisan. It 
was articulated with equal force by members of both the Ford and Carter 
Administrations. Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser in the 
Department of State under President Ford, testified that corruption 
“jeopardizes the important interests we share with our friends abroad” 
because it undermines a form of government “upon which social progress, 
economic justice, and perhaps, ultimately, world peace depends.”31 
Treasury Secretary William E. Simon further stated that it “adversely 
affects our relations with foreign governments and can contribute to a 
general deterioration in the climate for fair and open international trade 
and investment.”32 Ford’s Commerce Secretary, Elliot L. Richardson, 
 
 
 24. Id.  
 25. 1977 Prot. Hearings, supra note 22, at 173 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz). 
 26. 1976 House Consumer Prot. Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 21, at 141 (statement of Rep. 
Stephen J. Solarz). 
 27. Id. at 2 (statement of John M. Murphy, Chairman). 
 28. 1977 Prot. Hearings, supra note 22, at 173 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 23–24 (1975) 
(statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State). 
 32. Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 85 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Banking Hearings] (statement of 
William E. Simon, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/5
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further articulated: “Bribery . . . threatens to poison relationships between 
the United States and nations with which we have long had mutually 
beneficial political and commercial ties.”33 Ultimately, President Ford 
would formally state that reports of bribery “tend to destroy confidence” in 
liberal-democratic institutions.
34
 When the Carter Administration moved 
in, his Treasury Secretary stated, “The Carter Administration believes that 
it is damaging both to our country and to a healthy world economic system 
for American corporations to bribe foreign officials.”35 President Carter 
ultimately explained in his signing statement that “[c]orrupt practices 
between corporations and public officials overseas undermine the integrity 
and stability of governments and harm our relations with other countries. 
Recent revelations of widespread overseas bribery have eroded public 
confidence in our basic institutions.”36  
This view was expressed most forcefully by Democrat George Ball, 
who had become famous as a member of the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations for his opposition to the Vietnam War. Ball explained:  
The vast volume of speeches, pamphlets, and advertising copy and 
propaganda leaflets extolling the virtues of free enterprise are 
cancelled every night when managements demonstrate by their 
conduct that a sector of multinational business activity is not free; it 
is bought and paid for. This is a problem that, like so many others, 
has relevance in the struggle of antagonistic ideologies; for, when 
our enterprises stoop to bribery and kickbacks, they give substance 
to the communist myth—already widely believed in Third World 
countries—that capitalism is fundamentally corrupt.37  
Thus, even the most liberal, reform-minded advocates recognized the 
urgent foreign policy implications of international corporate bribery.  
Whether we sought to promote democracy overseas out of concern for 
those countries, or merely to advance our strategic interests, is of course 
debatable. But that is a question as to why we should promote democracy 
 
 
 33. Id. at 76. 
 34. FOREIGN PAYMENT DISCLOSURE, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
URGING ENACTMENT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO REQUIRE THE DISCLOSURE OF PAYMENTS TO 
FOREIGN OFFICIALS, H.R. DOC NO. 94-572, at 1 (1976). 
 35. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 67 (1977) at 67 (statement 
of W. Michael Blumenthal, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury). 
 36. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill: Statement on Signing S. 305 into 
Law, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1909, 1909 (Dec. 20, 1977). 
 37. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 32, at 41–42 (statement of George Ball, Lehman 
Bros.). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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through commerce, not whether we should do so. And though Congress 
then used the language of democracy rather than of human rights, the 
meaning is essentially the same. With the integration of these themes into 
both the Senate
38
 and House
39
 Reports, the bipartisan consensus 
concerning the FCPA’s intended effect becomes clear.  
But Congress ultimately entrusted enforcement authority to an agency 
that publicly admitted it lacked the foreign policy savvy necessary to 
effectively enforce a bribery prohibition. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) stated that overseas corporate bribery  
was a question beyond the scope of the SEC’s authority and 
expertise because it “presents a broad issue of national policy with 
important implications for international trade and commerce, the 
appropriateness of application of United States law to transactions 
by United States citizens in foreign countries, and the possible 
impact of such legislation upon the foreign relations of the United 
States.”40  
Professor Barbara Black has recently documented in impressive detail the 
awkwardness of this arrangement as felt by the SEC itself.
41
 Reading the 
legislative history, she notes that while the SEC was quite willing to 
accept enforcement responsibility for the books and records provisions of 
the FCPA,
42
 the SEC was not interested in enforcing the anti-bribery 
provisions and, in fact, “expressed no views on ‘whether there should be a 
general statutory prohibition against the making of certain kinds of foreign 
payments.’”43 Then-Chairman of the SEC, Roderick Hills, testified before 
Congress that the SEC would “prefer not to be involved” in enforcing a 
bribery prohibition because it would “embody separate distinct policies 
from those underlying the federal securities laws” and this policy “does 
not easily fit within the [SEC’s] mandate.”44  
 
 
 38. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977). 
 39. H. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977). 
 40. Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption 
Is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1098 (2012).  
 41. Id. (quoting U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, U.S. Senate 
157 (94th Sess., 2d Sess.) (May 1976) at 61-62 [hereinafter SEC REPORT]). 
 42. In addition to the anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA includes books and records and internal 
control provisions designed to prevent accounting and governance lapses. 
 43. Black, supra note 40, at 1098 (quoting SEC REPORT, supra note 41, at 61). 
 44. Id. at 1098–99 (quoting Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Inv. 
Disclosure: Hearing on S.305 Before the Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 
124–25 (1977) (statement of Roderick Hills, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n)). See also id. at 1099 
n.22 (“we do not seek nor entirely wish to have the responsibility for stopping these kinds of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss6/5
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The SEC fully appreciated that international bribery was, first and 
foremost, a question of foreign policy that a white-collar crime agency is 
ill-equipped to handle. Given the incongruence between the statute’s goals 
and its implementation, we should not be surprised to find the modern 
FCPA missile getting sideways. 
B. Empirical Evidence that Modern Enforcement Harms Developing 
Countries 
Empirical data from multiple sources demonstrate that anti-bribery 
enforcement causes companies subject to FCPA jurisdiction to withdraw 
their capital from developing countries. This, in turn, creates the very 
conditions in which bribery proliferates and illiberal regimes gain 
influence.  
Two sets of economic studies have demonstrated that anti-bribery 
enforcement causes corporations subject to its jurisdiction to do less 
business in bribery-prone markets. The first, in 1995 by James Hines, 
focused on the impact of the FCPA alone, finding that, controlling for 
other variables, FCPA enforcement caused a reduction in business in 
bribery-prone countries.
45
 To clarify, the thesis is not that U.S. companies 
were investing less overall in developing countries in 1995 than they were 
in 1976—indeed, such a conclusion would be absurd and patently 
unsupportable. Rather, the finding was that companies did less business in 
such countries than they would have if the FCPA did not exist. This initial 
study further found that total investment in bribery-prone countries did not 
drop; rather, U.S. investment was replaced by investment from countries 
without bribery prohibitions, a process termed “ownership substitution.”46  
A second set of studies conducted after enactment of the OECD 
Convention Against Bribery confirmed the finding that as anti-bribery 
legislation became more prevalent, bribery-prone countries received less 
of their foreign direct investment (FDI) from OECD nations and more 
from nations without bribery prohibitions.
47
 Professor Alvaro Cuervo-
 
 
payments.”); Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 
961–69 (2012). 
 45. James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After 1977 
1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w5266.pdf. 
 46. Id. at 20. 
 47. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares about Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 807, 818 
(2006). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Cazurra essentially confirmed and expanded upon Hines’ thesis.48 Cuervo-
Cazurra’s study was narrower than Hines’ in that he focused exclusively 
on FDI, but broader in that Cuervo-Cazurra used data on bilateral FDI 
inflows from 183 home economies to 106 host economies with varying 
quantified corruption levels.
49
 
Cuervo-Cazurra further found that the phenomenon of businesses from 
countries with anti-bribery legislation investing less in highly corrupt 
countries was not limited to the United States. Rather, high levels of 
corruption in a host country generally resulted in less FDI from signatories 
to the OECD convention.
50
 The same phenomenon that Hines identified 
with respect to the United States thus became more widespread as a result 
of the OECD convention. The underside of the phenomenon that Hines 
first identified—countries that are not bound by anti-bribery legislation 
continue to invest in corrupt countries—was likewise confirmed by 
Cuervo-Cazurra. Post-OECD, as signatory countries invested less in 
corrupt countries, countries with higher levels of corruption received 
relatively more FDI from countries with similarly higher corruption 
levels.
51
 The result of these trends is that as anti-bribery legislation became 
more widespread, corrupt countries received less of their FDI from less-
corrupt countries and more of their FDI from more-corrupt countries.
52
 
In a second empirical study,
53
 Cuervo-Cazurra verified and restated his 
finding that countries which implemented the OECD Convention had 
become “more sensitive” to corruption and had reduced their FDI in more-
corrupt countries.
54
 He then proposed a modification of Hines’ original 
thesis, concluding that prior to the OECD convention, U.S. investors were 
 
 
 48. Id. at 814. Cuervo-Cazurra further noted that Hines’ study had become subject to various 
methodological disputes, as noted in Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing is Corruption on International 
Investors?, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2000). Cuervo-Cazurra believed that he had improved upon 
Hines’ methodology and yet confirmed the results. See Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 47, at 808–09. 
Evaluating these methodologies is not the purpose of this Article. For further empirical studies 
confirming FCPA enforcement’s negative impact on FDI, see also Paul J. Beck et al., The Impact of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on US Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 295, 300 
(1991); Rajib Sanyal and Subarna Samanta, Effect of Perception of Corruption on Outward U.S. 
Foreign Direct Investment, 10 GLOBAL BUS. & ECON. REV. 123, 137 (2008); OHANN GRAF 
LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND REFORM: THEORY, EVIDENCE 
AND POLICY 174 (2007); Anna D’Souza, The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the Currents 
of Trade, 97 J. DEV. ECON. 73, 79 (2012). 
 49. Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 47, at 811. 
 50. Id. at 807–08. 
 51. Id. at 808. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad, 39 J. INT’L BUS. 
STUD. 634 (2008). 
 54. Id. at 644. 
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not in fact investing less in corrupt countries, but that they began investing 
less after OECD ratification.
55
 In other words, the FCPA standing alone 
did not induce U.S. investors to invest less in corrupt countries, but rather 
the OECD induced both U.S. and other OECD signatories to invest less.
56
 
We may be surprised to discover that for a period, the U.S. government 
formally adopted and publicly embraced this very position: that FCPA 
enforcement reduced U.S. investment in developing countries. After the 
FCPA’s enactment in 1977, the U.S. government began lobbying the 
western world to enact a similar prohibition, ultimately succeeding in 1997 
with the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.
57
 In the testimony 
before Congress, a common theme was that the U.S. business community 
was losing business overseas as a result of the FCPA. In his message 
transmitting the Convention, President Bill Clinton noted that the United 
States “ha[d] been alone” in criminalizing overseas bribery and that 
“United States corporations have contended that this has put them at a 
significant disadvantage in competing for international contracts with 
respect to foreign competitors who are not subject to such laws.”58 
Numerous congressmen testified that the Convention would “level[] the 
playing field,”59 as did SEC Associate Director Paul Gerlach.60 Ultimately, 
President Clinton would adopt this metaphor in his signing statement.
61
 
Moreover, the Clinton Administration calculated a very specific estimate 
of the amount of business that U.S. corporations were losing. President 
Clinton indicated in his signing statement that the value of the contracts 
lost to U.S. businesses each year as a result of the FCPA was $30 billion.
62
 
An Undersecretary of State and the General Counsel of the Office of the 
Secretary of Commerce
63
 encompassed the same figure in their testimony. 
 
 
 55. Id. at 645. 
 56. See also D’Souza, supra note 48. 
 57. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).  
 58. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43, at III (1998). 
 59. See, e.g., The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998 Hearing Before 
the Finance and Hazardous Materials Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 1 
(1998) [hereinafter 1998 House Finance Hearing] (statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Fin. & Hazardous Materials); id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Tom Bliley, Chairman, H. 
Comm. on Commerce). 
 60. Id. at 11 (statement of Paul V. Gerlach, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n). 
 61. Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 2011 (Nov. 10, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Presidential Signing Statement]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 59, at 6 (statement of Andrew J. Pincus, General 
Counsel to the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce). 
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The argument proved persuasive and the U.S. joined the OECD 
Convention.  
But the empirical studies merely confirm what common sense would 
teach: if we increase the costs of conducting business through the FCPA, 
we will tend to do less business in corrupt countries. Indeed, this sense is 
captured by the rapid accumulation of anecdotal evidence in surveys and 
congressional testimony. A 2009 Dow Jones Risk Compliance survey, 
announced in a press release entitled, “Amid Confusion About Anti-
corruption Laws, Companies Abandon Expansion Initiatives,” found that 
51% of companies had delayed a business initiative as a result of the 
FCPA and 14% had abandoned an initiative altogether.
64
 More recently, a 
2011 survey by the accounting firm KPMG found that among executives 
surveyed in the United States and the United Kingdom, “more than 70% 
. . . agreed there are places in the world where business cannot be done 
without engaging in bribery and corruption.” Approximately 30% of the 
respondents indicated that they deal with this risk by not doing business in 
certain countries.
65
 
This capital withdrawal, and other countries’ exploitation of it, recently 
reappeared in congressional testimony. During the June 2011 hearing on 
amending the FCPA, attorney George Terwilliger noted that while we are 
realizing the goal of heightened compliance with anti-bribery provisions:  
[T]here is another less desirable effect . . . when companies forgo 
business opportunity out of concern for FCPA compliance risk. This 
hurts the creation of [U.S.] jobs and the ability of U.S. companies to 
compete with companies elsewhere that do not have to concern 
themselves with uncertainties of the terms and requirements of the 
FCPA. . . .  
[T]here is hidden cost borne of the uncertainties attached to FCPA 
compliance risk. . . .  
[C]ompanies sometimes forgo deals they could otherwise do, take a 
pass on contemplated projects, or withdraw from ongoing projects 
and ventures.
66
  
 
 
 64. See Press Release, Dow Jones Risk & Compliance, Dow Jones Survey: Amid confusion 
about Anti-corruption Laws, Companies Abandon Expansion Initiatives (Dec. 9, 2009), available at 
http://fis.dowjones.com/risk/09survey.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2014). 
 65. Mike Koehler, Survey Says. . ., FCPA PROFESSOR (June 2, 2011, 5:25 AM), http://fcpa 
professor.blogspot.com/2011/06/survey-says.html (quoting KPMG, GLOBAL ANTI-BRIBERY AND 
CORRUPTION SURVEY 2011, at 18 (2011)). 
 66. Testimony of George J. Terwilliger III, Esq., Partner, White & Case LLP before the House 
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We have a name for this dynamic, and that name is not flattering. The 
label we generally attach to the government-induced withdrawal of capital 
from developing countries in protest of their political conditions is 
“economic sanctions.” The broader project of which this paper is a part 
analyzes the “sanctioning effect” of anti-bribery law.67 Economic 
sanctions literature teaches that when some part of the world sanctions a 
given country, a capital void is created. Because the sanctioned country 
still needs that capital (i.e., FDI) to stimulate its economic growth, it will 
look to countries not participating in the sanctions to fill the void. These 
latter countries are sometimes called “black knights”—they rescue the 
sanctioned country, but through nefarious means.
68
 
Anti-corruption law is today creating a similar sanctioning effect, as 
the empirical evidence above concerning “ownership substitution” and the 
survey data both demonstrate. The principal black knight in the anti-
bribery space is China—a country with ample capital, an aggressive 
foreign and economic policy, and a near-complete absence of 
extraterritorial anti-corruption enforcement.
69
 When companies subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction find the risk of a bribery violation too high, and they 
withdraw from a project, or a sector, or a country, and the resulting FDI 
void is frequently filled by Chinese or other “black knight” companies 
who may engage in bribery without fear of penalty. The net result is that 
although U.S. corporations (or foreign corporations subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction) are committing bribery less often, the overall amount of 
bribery occurring in developing countries can actually increase. Although 
the proliferation of FCPA compliance practices among U.S. law firms 
suggests the FCPA has deterred bribery among companies subject to its 
jurisdiction,
70
 it has simultaneously done something else altogether: it has 
created the very conditions in which corruption proliferates. 
But we can fix this problem, as the next Part begins to describe.  
 
 
Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Hearing on The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, WHITE & CASE, LLP., available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/ 
Publication/c6278e72-532d-4e06-9560-399f13e044e2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5c656213-
2a02-4bf0-ba94-42caf31a7218/alert_George_Terwilliger_Testify_FCPA_Reform.pdf. 
 67. See Spalding, Irony of International Business Law, supra note 17; Spalding, Four 
Unchartered Corners, supra note 18; Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, supra note 17. Portions of Parts 
I.A. and I.B. have been adapted from material that previously appeared in one or more of those papers. 
 68. See Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, supra note 17, at 397. 
 69. See Spalding, Irony of International Business Law, supra note 17, at 360–61. 
 70. Jordan Weissmann, The Corruption Law That Scares the Bejeesus Out of Corporate 
America, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2012/04/the-corruption-law-that-scares-the-bejesus-out-of-corporate-america/256314/; see also Joe 
Palazzollo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10000872396390443862604578028462294611352. 
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C. How a Rights Paradigm Resolves the Paradox 
An alternative enforcement regime would focus on promoting liberal-
democratic values and institutions through ethical commerce, just as those 
who testified before Congress originally imagined. Or, put another way, it 
would seek to actually improve the conditions of the citizens in countries 
where U.S. companies do business.  
A new regime could accomplish this through an approach with two 
prongs, neither of which is currently practiced to a meaningful degree nor 
lies within the white-collar-crime paradigm. The first prong would involve 
preventing the black knights from filling the capital void left by 
withdrawing companies. To achieve this goal, the black knights must 
become subject to meaningfully enforced anti-bribery laws. While the 
FCPA’s jurisdictional scope is indeed broad, it is also limited; true global 
enforcement requires the world’s principal capital-exporting nations to 
adopt and enforce their own extraterritorial bribery prohibitions. If all 
multinational companies were subject to such laws, there would be no 
black knights, no ownership substitution, and FCPA enforcement would 
not cause foreign bribery to proliferate. The second prong would directly 
address the damage done by corporate bribery in the communities in 
which the bribery occurred. That is, our enforcement agencies could use 
FCPA enforcement to remedy the harms of large-scale corporate bribery 
and improve the political cultures and institutions in developing countries.  
The seeds of a radical rethinking of anti-bribery policy lie in the 
Obama Administration’s recent policy pronouncement. The 2010 National 
Security Strategy
71
 outlines a set of ways to “Promote Democracy and 
Human Rights Abroad.”72 Among them is “Strengthening International 
Norms Against Corruption.”73 There, the President announced “that 
pervasive corruption is a violation of basic human rights.”74 The report 
explains that the Administration is working with other organizations, such 
as the United Nations, G-20, OECD, and international financial 
institutions, to protect this right, and it provides a number of more specific 
tactics for promoting transparency in transactions within and between 
institutions.
75
  
 
 
 71. See OBAMA REPORT, supra note 15.  
 72. Id. at 37. 
 73. Id. at 38. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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Though in hushed tones, the report in effect announces that as a matter 
of official policy, freedom from corruption is a new universal human right. 
The potential impact of this paradigm shift is vast. In the bribery context 
specifically, this is best illustrated in two case studies. The first, the 2008 
Siemens case, is certainly the highest-profile enforcement action in FCPA 
history; the second, the now-pending Wal-Mart investigation, is likely to 
displace it.  
Siemens’ systematic bribery in multiple sectors across the developing 
world violated an assortment of widely-recognized human rights. But the 
government’s filings are remarkably silent on the issue of overseas impact. 
These filings are instead written in what we might call the discourse of 
white-collar crime. Siemens, a Germany-based manufacturer of industrial 
and consumer products,
76
 is the quintessential multinational corporation. 
After World War II had destroyed much of its business,
77
 Siemens began 
building a multinational operation that now consists of over 1800 legal 
entities with 400,000 employees in 190 countries.
78
 In 2001, it listed 
American Depository Shares on the New York Stock Exchange, thus 
becoming an “issuer” for purposes of the FCPA and triggering its 
jurisdiction.
79
 Siemens may now regret that decision; it ultimately paid a 
total of $1.6 billion in fines, penalties, and disgorgement of profits, the 
largest settlement in FCPA history.
80
 The SEC alleged that between 2001 
and 2007 the conglomerate made at least 4200 payments, totaling over 
$1.4 billion, to bribe government officials around the world in return for 
business.
81
  
As the government’s pleadings described in detail, Siemens’ bribery 
scheme would corrupt various sectors of society in numerous countries. 
Regarding infrastructure, arguably the most critical sector to a developing 
country’s growth, Siemens and its subsidiaries paid Chinese officials $22 
million to fraudulently obtain contracts for rail construction
82
 and $25 
 
 
 76. Siemens builds including locomotives, traffic control systems, and electrical power plants, as 
well as building control systems, medical equipment and electrical components. See Complaint at 3, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 08 Civ. 02167) [hereinafter 
“SEC Complaint”]. 
 77. Id. at 8–9. 
 78. Id. at 3. 
 79. Id. at 4.  
 80. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 
15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html [hereinafter 
“DOJ Press Release”]. 
 81. SEC Complaint, supra note 76, at 2. 
 82. Id. at 16–17. 
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million to construct high-voltage transmission lines;
83
 $17 million in 
Venezuela for more railway contracts;
84
 $800,000 for the construction of 
traffic control systems in Russia;
85
 $20 million in Israel for contracts to 
build and service power plants;
86
 $2.6 million in connection with refinery 
projects in Mexico;
87
 $5 million for a contract to install mobile telephone 
services in Bangladesh;”88 and $12 million in connection with 
telecommunications in projects in Nigeria, where Siemens’ bribery 
practices were allegedly “long-standing and systematic.”89 In the health 
care sector, Siemens paid $14 million in connection with the sale of 
medical equipment to state-owned hospitals;
90
 $55 million in connection 
with the sales of medical equipment in Russia, routed through Dubai;
91
 in 
Vietnam, a Siemens representative picked up an envelope with $183,000 
left by a Hong Kong businessman in a Singapore hotel, flew to the Hanoi 
airport to pass on to another Siemens representative, and used it to bribe 
the Vietnamese Ministry of Health.
92
  
But perhaps most egregious from a foreign policy perspective was 
Siemens’ role in corrupting the U.N. Oil for Food Program. The program 
was designed to alleviate the suffering of Iraqi citizens caused by the 
economic sanctions imposed against the Hussein regime following the 
Gulf War.
93
 The Hussein regime soon adopted a policy, enforced across 
the Iraqi ministries, to require suppliers to pay government officials a ten 
percent kickback on each contract.
94
 Foreign suppliers were instructed to 
inflate their bids and purchase orders by ten percent, allowing the 
suppliers to collect the money from the UN escrow account and then 
redirect it to Hussein’s officials.95 The suppliers thus became middlemen, 
transferring money from the sale of crude oil back into the hands of the 
 
 
 83. Id. at 18. 
 84. Id. at 28–29. 
 85. Id. at 25–26. 
 86. Id. at 17–18. 
 87. Id. at 26. 
 88. Id. at 19. 
 89. Id. at 29. 
 90. Id. at 23. 
 91. Id. at 27. 
 92. Id. at 22–23. 
 93. Under the program, Iraq could sell its oil and deposit the proceeds in a UN-managed escrow 
account. Funds in the account would thus be used for the limited purpose of purchasing food, 
medicine, and infrastructure supplies. See, e.g., Susan A. Notar, The Oil-For-Food Program and the 
Need for Oversight Entities to Monitor UN Sanctions Regimes, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 163 
(2007). 
 94. Id. at 165. 
 95. Id. 
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officials, and thereby directly undermining the UN-imposed sanctions 
regime and perpetuating Hussein’s rule. Former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker would ultimately be asked to lead an independent 
UN-commissioned committee and found that the Hussein regime had 
collected $1.7 billion in bribes.
96
 Operating through French, Turkish, and 
Middle East subsidiaries, Siemens paid kickbacks to the Hussein regime of 
approximately $1.7 million.
97
 These bribes allowed the conglomerate to 
fraudulently obtain contracts that would yield approximately $38 million 
in profits.
98
  
Siemens’ bribes across the developing world thus variously 
compromised rights to medical care, to equality of access to public 
services, to self-determination, to political representation, and ultimately 
to the basic rule of law. But despite these manifest human rights 
implications, the way in which the SEC and DOJ ultimately characterized 
Siemens’ misconduct made for a sharp and telling contrast. The settlement 
documents noted that Siemens created payment schemes that the 
“company’s inadequate internal controls allowed to flourish.”99 Siemens 
used numerous “slush funds” and “off-books accounts maintained at 
unconsolidated entities.”100 Indeed, the “tone at the top” at Siemens was 
“inconsistent with an effective FCPA compliance program” and “created a 
corporate culture in which bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the 
highest levels of the company.”101 The SEC’s press release quoted an 
associate director of the Enforcement Division to say, “[t]he day is past 
when multi-national corporations could regard illicit payments to foreign 
officials as simply another cost of doing business.”102 Similarly, the SEC’s 
litigation release notes that Siemens’ Managing Board “was ineffective in 
implementing controls” and in meeting the “U.S. regulatory requirements 
that Siemens was subject to following its . . . listing on the New York 
Stock Exchange.”103 It further explained that “[f]alse invoices and 
 
 
 96. PAUL A. VOLCKER ET AL., INDEP. INQUIRY COMM. INTO THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-
FOOD PROGRAMME, MANIPULATION OF THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME BY THE IRAQI REGIME 
(2005), available at http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf. 
 97. SEC Complaint, supra note 76, at 29–31. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide 
Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Litigation Release 20829, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft, Civil Action No. 08 CV 02167 (D.D.C.) (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/litigation/ litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm. 
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payment documentation was created to make payments to business 
consultants under false [] agreements,” and that “illicit payments were 
falsely recorded as expenses for management fees, consulting fees, supply 
contracts . . . and commissions.”104 The DOJ ultimately proclaimed that its 
enforcement efforts would “level the business playing field, making 
it . . . fair to those who seek to participate in it.”105  
This is the discourse of white-collar crime enforcement, not of human 
rights. The difference, and its inherent shortcomings, are apparent in two 
ways. First, the SEC and DOJ documents make virtually no mention of the 
damage done to these communities. Besides cursory uses of terms like 
“corruption,” the legal claims are resolved without any evident regard for 
the resulting human rights abuses in Iraq, China, Russia, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, and the other countries encompassed by Siemens’ bribery 
scheme. Second, the notion that FCPA enforcement “levels the playing 
field” makes a critical assumption about the conduct of the other “players” 
in international business: that they are not paying bribes. It assumes that 
the payment of bribes tips the playing field in favor of the bribe payor. But 
if its competitors are paying bribes, enforcement does not make the 
playing field “level.” Quite the contrary: FCPA enforcement could only 
level the playing field if all companies were subject to its jurisdiction. The 
settlement documents thus fail to acknowledge what occurs in these 
markets when companies subject to FCPA jurisdiction begin to pull out, as 
the empirical evidence indicates. Our enforcement is oblivious to the 
human rights implications of anti-bribery law generally, and more 
specifically, of the sanctioning effect. 
The Wal-Mart enforcement action provides perhaps an optimal 
opportunity to reset this paradigm. The issue exploded in the public 
consciousness in April 2012 with an extensive and detailed New York 
Times exposé.
106
 Wal-Mart’s internal investigation found evidence of tens 
of millions of dollars in bribes to Mexican officials that had been 
accounted for as “legal fees,” paid through local middlemen known as 
“gestores.”107 The bribes allegedly enabled Wal-Mart to fraudulently 
obtain zoning and environmental approvals, eliminate fines, evade taxes, 
 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. DOJ Press Release, supra note 80. 
 106. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level 
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at A01. Wal-Mart had disclosed as early as December 2011 that 
it was subject to FCPA scrutiny. WAL-MART STORES, INC., FORM 10-Q, available at http://www.sec. 
gov/Archives/edgar/data/104169/000119312511335177/d233066d10q.htm (filed Dec. 8, 2011). 
 107. Barstow, Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up, supra note 106. 
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and obtain confidential information.
108
 Some bribes permitted Wal-Mart to 
fraudulently circumvent zoning restrictions and construct a new store 
immediately adjacent to the ancient pyramids of Teotihuacan, despite the 
hunger strikes and sit-ins of local community activists.
109
 Wal-Mart would 
eventually promote the CEO of the Mexican subsidiary to vice-chairman 
of the parent company due to his “outstanding results” in Mexico.110  
The case has and will continue to garner widespread attention because 
of the defendant: the quintessential U.S.-based multinational corporation 
with an aggressive growth strategy whose practices and tactics were 
already controversial. Indeed, more than half of Wal-Mart’s roughly 
10,500 stores are international; it is Mexico’s largest private employer.111 
But the Wal-Mart case also tees up, more perfectly than this author could 
have dreamed, the larger issues of bribery’s nature and impact across the 
developing world. In November 2012, Wal-Mart announced in an SEC 
filing that its bribery investigation had expanded to other countries, 
including but not limited to Brazil, India, and China.
112
 The Wal-Mart case 
now presents arguably the most (in)famous U.S.-based multinational 
corporation investing in the world’s flagship emerging markets and using 
bribery to circumvent key regulations designed to protect human rights to 
health and safety. When the eventual settlement thrusts this case back into 
the public consciousness, it will create a historic opportunity to reexamine 
the impact of anti-bribery enforcement on developing countries. 
II. REFRAMING BRIBERY: FROM WHITE-COLLAR CRIME TO HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
The Obama policy announcement was as cursory as it was bold; it 
made no effort to ground its assertion that corruption violates a human 
right in deeper rights theory. This Part will pick up where the President 
left off, by developing a philosophical justification for the principle that 
corruption is properly understood as a violation of basic human rights. To 
be clear, this Part will not argue that the right to be free from corruption is 
 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. David Barstow, The Bribery Aisle: How Wal-Mart Used Payoffs to Get Its Way in Mexico, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at A01. 
 110. Barstow, Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up, supra note 106. 
 111. Stephanie Clifford & David Barstow, Wal-Mart Takes a Broader Look at Bribery Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A1. 
 112. WAL-MART STORES, INC. FORM 8-K, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
104169/000119312512471604/d440140d8k.htm (filed Nov. 15, 2012). 
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at present legally binding right under existing international covenants,
113
 
or customary international law
114
 more broadly. Rather, it argues that 
irrespective of what international covenants and customs now require, 
anti-corruption laws generally and anti-bribery laws specifically should be 
enforced as if they implicated human rights.  
Part II.A will first develop a definition of corruption that is suitable to 
the twenty-first century, an era in which bribery may be the quintessential 
form of anti-corruption enforcement. Part II.B will then draw on the 
political philosophy of John Locke to demonstrate that corruption, 
properly defined, is correctly understood as violating a right. Part II.C will 
then illustrate how a new rights-based paradigm for understanding 
corruption would transform our understanding of large-scale corporate 
bribery by considering two recent case studies.  
A. Redefining Corruption for the Anti-Bribery Era 
Three definitions, or approaches to defining corruption, now circulate 
in corruption law discussions: I will call them the United Nations 
approach, the World Bank approach, and the Black’s Law Dictionary 
approach. Because none of these enables a sophisticated discussion of how 
corruption law operates today, I propose a new definition. 
The study of corruption is multidisciplinary, and various disciplines 
have produced their definitions, each viewing the phenomenon through its 
 
 
 113. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter “UDHR”]; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, art. 9, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter “ICCPR”]. 
 114. The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines international custom as “a general 
practice accepted as law,” thus having two elements: 1) a general practice (meaning that most states, 
(including those whose interests are specially affected, should follow the practice); that is 2) accepted 
as law. See Charter of the United Nations, June 16, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter “U.N. Charter”]; 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter 
“I.C.J. Statute”]. The second prong is easily satisfied; virtually every jurisdiction prohibits bribery, 
embezzlement, and various other forms of corruption. The critical question for a customary 
international law analysis is whether that legal prohibition is satisfied by a general practice. To the 
extent that this practice would consist of active enforcement, the first prong would almost certainly not 
be satisfied; most of the world, especially the developing countries that would be “specially affected” 
by international corruption law, devotes egregiously insufficient resources to anti-corruption 
enforcement. But satisfying both prongs still would not demonstrate that corruption as a right is 
customary international law and that states thus have a duty to treat corruption as rights violations. See 
U.N. Charter, supra; I.C.J. Statute, supra. See also STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 45–46 (2006). For a discussion of whether bribery could constitute a violation 
under the ATS, see Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether 
Transnational Corporations are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 385 (2010). 
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own lens.
115
 Political scientists see corruption in the abuse of state power 
resulting from the absence of checks.
116
 Economists see corruption when 
the benefit of acting contrary to duty outweighs the cost, where public 
goods are sold for personal gain, or where public officials use their 
monopoly to exploit economic rents.
117
 Sociologists will sometimes see 
corruption as an absence of socially accepted norms, occurring in 
countries where historical and socio-cultural conflict has resulted from 
conflicting values within social groups.
118
  
When searching for a proper legal definition, we must first clarify that 
our focus must be on the noun, “corruption,” and not “corrupt” or 
“corruptly”; this has proven to be far more than a grammatical distinction. 
The adjective and adverb are indeed central features of criminal law, 
generally describing an intent; case in point, corrupt intent is an element of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
119
 And generally (though not in the 
FCPA), courts have paid substantial attention to defining intent, typically 
through reference to an evil purpose.
120
 The corruption at issue in this 
Article, rather, is a more specific subset of criminal activity. Defining that 
subset—legally proscribed acts that we would generally think of as 
belonging in the category of “corruption”—is the task at hand.  
Though I call the first definition the “United Nations approach,” it 
might also be called the “Justice Potter Stewart approach.” His infamous 
non-definition of obscenity—“I know it when I see it”121—may apply just 
as well to corruption. And ironically (or not), this is precisely the approach 
taken by what is probably the most widely-cited corruption document in 
 
 
 115. For an excellent survey of various disciplines’ approaches, see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, 
Corruption—A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L. 
451, 453–58 (1997). 
 116. See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 9 
(1978); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
REFORM (1999); Michael Johnston, The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment, 18 
COMP. POL. 459, 464 (1986). 
 117. See, e.g., ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 22 (1988); Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. ECON. 599, 599 (1993); Moisés Naím, The Corruption 
Eruption, 2 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 245, 248 (1995). 
 118. See, e.g., Shihata, supra note 115, at 456–57. See generally Vito Tanzi, Corruption, 
Governmental Activities, and Markets (Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper No. 94/99, 1994), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=883840; James C. Scott, The Analysis 
of Corruption in Developing Nations, in BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: 
TOWARD A SEARCH FOR CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Monday U. Epko ed., 1979). 
 119. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2012). 
 120. See U.S. v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888, 
894 (9th Cir. 1994).  
 121. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (J., Stewart, concurring).  
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the world, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.
122
 Though 
the Convention uses the term in its title, and enumerates various specific 
forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, trading in influence, etc.), 
nowhere within the document is a definition for the term. Thus, this 
approach essentially punts on the definitional problem, avoiding it 
altogether. 
Of the substantive legal definitions now in circulation, the most 
common is what I will call the “World Bank definition”: “the abuse of 
public office for private gain,” or minor variations thereon. The World 
Bank has formally adopted or, to use its term, “settled” on this 
definition.
123
 Minor variants of the definition, such as the illegal use of 
public resources for personal gain,
124
 appear in other World Bank 
publications.
125
 Transparency International, the world’s leading anti-
corruption NGO,
126
 has similarly adopted “the abuse of entrusted power 
for private gain.”127 The United States Agency for International 
Development has in turn adopted a variation: “the abuse of entrusted 
authority for private gain.”128 This slightly broader definition encompasses 
private-sector corruption, such as bank fraud, in addition to the more 
familiar public-sector corruption.
129
 
Tracing the World Bank definition’s intellectual heritage reveals its 
inherent limitations. In the wake of Watergate, political scientists sought 
to broaden the definition of corruption to encompass various forms of 
 
 
 122. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/58/4 (Oct. 31, 
2003), reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004) [hereinafter UNCAC].  
 123. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE 
WORLD BANK 8 (1997), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/ 
corrptn.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK REPORT]. 
 124. Id. at 19.  
 125. The Bank considered and rejected other, more narrow definitions, such as Susan Rose-
Ackerman’s “an illegal payment to a public agent to obtain a benefit that may or may not be deserved 
in the absence of payoffs” or Shleifer and Vishny’s “the sale by government officials of government 
property for personal gain.” See id. at 19–20 n.1 (citing ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 116; Andre Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. ECON. 
599 (1993)). 
 126. Transparency International is an international NGO that “work[s] with partners in 
government, business and civil society to put effective measures in place to tackle corruption.” See 
Who We Are: Our Organisation, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/ 
organization (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
 127. INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY & TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING THE CONNECTION 16 (2009), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/ 
40/131_web.pdf [hereinafter MAKING THE CONNECTION]. 
 128. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AN ANTICORRUPTION READER: SUPPLEMENTAL SOURCES ON 
TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, PREVENTION, ENFORCEMENT & EDUCATION 14 (2005), available 
at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF530.pdf [hereinafter USAID REPORT]. 
 129. Id.  
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illicit behavior that the Watergate investigation exposed.
130
 The effort to 
develop a more inclusive definition gave rise to remarkably broad 
definitions. One group of scholars produced: “the misuse of authority as a 
result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary.”131 
Another scholar of this era defined corruption as “all illegal or unethical 
use of governmental authority as a result of considerations of personal or 
political gain.”132 Notably, these definitions are roughly contemporaneous 
with another fruit of the Watergate investigations, the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act itself.
133
  
But scholars immediately criticized the newly-broadened definition for 
“sacrific[ing] clarity to brevity.”134 Political scientists argued that  
the looseness of contemporary definitions provides infinite scope 
for argument. . . . [T]he danger here seems to be that clarity and 
consistency in analysis may have been sacrificed for 
comprehensiveness.  
. . . . 
The fundamental weakness of the recent literature on corruption lies 
in the use of vague criteria and inappropriate perspectives which 
distort, exaggerate or otherwise over-simplify explanations of 
corruption . . . .
135
  
Though the broader World Bank definition’s appeal is that it 
encompasses more than bribery (extortion, embezzlement, trading in 
influence, etc.), it includes far too much to be of use. Specifically, it 
encompasses conduct that, while controversial and perhaps distasteful, is 
not generally thought to be the kind of corruption that the law can or 
should proscribe. Consider the elected official who changes her position to 
win the support of a targeted voting demographic, or votes against her 
conscience to placate a donor. These may well constitute the abuse of 
 
 
 130. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Terms, Concepts, and Definitions, in PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION: 
CONCEPTS & CONTEXTS 112 (Michael Johnston ed., 2010). 
 131. Id. at 114 (quoting this idea without citation). 
 132. Id. at 113 (quoting GEORGE C.S. BENSON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AMERICA xiii (1978)). 
See also Carl J. Friedrich, Political Pathology, 37 POL. Q. 70, 74 (1966) (“deviant behavior associated 
with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense.”). 
 133. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 3 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
fcpa/guide.pdf.  
 134. Heidenheimer, supra note 130, at 111 (quoting ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER & MICHAEL 
JOHNSTON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 3 (1989)). 
 135. Robert J. Williams, Political Corruption in the United States, 29 POL. STUD. 126–29 (1981).  
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public office for public gain, and may elicit criticism. But, for better or for 
worse, they are extraordinarily common even in societies not generally 
thought to be relatively corrupt, and are not objects of the anti-corruption 
movement. We live with them, resigned as we may be to human and 
institutional imperfection, and are not especially eager to criminalize them. 
So while the World Bank definition may serve the broader anti-corruption 
effort, it is not particularly useful for legal purposes.  
A more precise, but still inadequate, legal definition comes from 
Black’s Law Dictionary. When not focusing specifically on the personal 
moral corrupt intent of criminal law, Black’s defines corruption as “a 
fiduciary’s or official’s use of a station or office to procure some benefit 
either personally or for someone else, contrary to the rights of others.”136 
This definition has gained some traction in federal case law on the 
domestic bribery statute,
137
 and is sometimes mentioned tangentially in 
relation to corrupt motive criminal litigation.
138
 But the definition does not 
appear to have been formulated by courts. Black’s cites a series of late-
nineteenth century cases, but none actually uses the definition.
139
 Other 
legal dictionaries from the early twentieth century cited variations 
thereof.
140
 More recent cases will cite the definition, but none claims credit 
for developing it; each will cite to it as Black’s.141 To adopt Judge 
Friendly’s characterization of the ATS, the Black’s definition is a bit of a 
“legal Lohengrin”—no one knows whence it came.142 The definition may 
well be the product not of courts or legislatures, but of dictionary editors.  
 
 
 136. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
 137. See United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Revis, 22 F. 
Supp. 2d 1242, 1250 (N.D. Okla. 1998). 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Aguilar, 
515 U.S. 593, 597 (1995). 
 139. Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 347–48, 351 (1877) (“When an act is of such a nature that 
a payment to the person by whom it is to be done would be at variance with good morals and the best 
interests of society, a promise to pay another for inducing him to do it by secret and undue solicitation, 
as distinguished form fair and open advocacy, will be deemed contrary to public policy, as giving 
occasion for fraud and corruption. . . . Corruption is a hard word, not always accurately understood; 
covering a multitude of official delinquencies, great and little. But it is strictly accurate to apply it to 
any color of influence, of mere relation of any kind, on the administration of justice.”). See also 
Worsham v. Murchison, 66 Ga. 715 (1881); United States v. Edwards, 43 F. 67 (S.D. Ala. 1890); State 
v. Ragsdale, 59 Mo. App. 590 (1984).  
 140. See WALTER A. SHUMAKER & GEORGE FOSTER LONGSDORF, THE CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 
OF LAW WITH AN EXHAUSTIVE COLLECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 210 (1901); BALLANTINE’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969). See also “Corruption”: Legal Definition, DUHAIME.ORG, 
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/Corruption.aspx (last visited Aug. 21, 2013). 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 142. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds by 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).  
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However well it may have encompassed the principal forms of legally 
proscribed corruption in days of old, the advent of the modern anti-bribery 
regime renders this definition antiquated. To understand the limitations of 
this definition, consider a scenario in which a sole proprietorship 
successfully bribes a foreign official for business purposes. By Black’s 
definition, the public official has indeed engaged in corruption; she has 
used her office to procure some benefit for herself that is contrary to the 
rights of others. But has the bribe payor, the sole proprietor, engaged in 
corruption? Black’s provides two categories of perpetrators: officials and 
fiduciaries. The sole proprietor is neither: he is not the official, and 
because he is not in an agent-principal relationship, he is not a fiduciary. 
Accordingly, by Black’s definition, our sole proprietor has not engaged in 
corruption; he has merely induced, or aided and abetted, corruption.  
This definition is thus inconsistent with our modern sense of the word. 
Nearly all would agree that the FCPA, for example, prohibits a specific 
form of corruption—namely, bribery. And the FCPA criminalizes the 
offering, but not the receipt, of a bribe.
143
 Few would accept that bribery 
merely targets inducements or aids to corruption; we would agree that the 
bribe is itself an act of corruption.  
Indeed, two recently enacted legal documents reflect this contemporary 
sense of the word, and in so doing tacitly refute Black’s. Perhaps most 
telling is the definition of corruption implicit in the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery.
144
 Unlike UNCAC, the OECD Convention concerns 
bribery specifically, and not the more general phenomenon of corruption 
and its various manifestations. However, the Convention’s first endnote, 
or “commentary,” explains that the Convention deals with “active 
bribery,” which is the payment or offering of a bribe by a private actor to a 
foreign official (also known as supply-side bribery).
145
 But the note goes 
on to explain that active bribery is also often referred to in various 
countries as “active corruption.”146 Note that corruption, by this 
contemporary definition, extends to the offering or payment of a bribe by a 
private actor.  
Similarly, the U.K. recently enacted a Bribery Law that aimed to bring 
its antiquated corruption laws into conformity with the modern standards 
 
 
 143. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)), -2(a), -3(a) (2012). 
 144. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf. 
 145. Id. at 14, para. 1. 
 146. Id. 
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reflected in the OECD Convention or the FCPA.
147
 The parliamentary 
reports explain that since enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act in 
1906, U.K. law defined corruption to require an agent/principal 
relationship; absent this relationship, an act may well be improper but was 
not, strictly speaking, a legally recognized form of corruption.
148
 After 
years of consideration, Parliament elected to drop this requirement, stating 
that it wished to “avoid the need for an agent to betray a principal as in 
[past] legislation. The offence [of bribery] would be committed by 
someone who offers an advantage to another as a reward for breaching a 
trust, or breaching a duty to act impartially . . . .”149 Both the OECD and 
the U.K., then, have abandoned the notion that a private actor engages in 
corruption only insofar as she breaches a fiduciary duty. 
The anticipated defense of Black’s proves unpersuasive on several 
counts. The defense would be that for most commercial entities, the bribe 
payor will be an agent acting on behalf of its principal, the entity. Because 
committing an illegal act constitutes a violation of fiduciary duty, the bribe 
payor has now fallen within Black’s definition. But this explanation 
suffers from three distinct problems. First, by this logic the bribe payment 
constitutes corruption only because the law prohibits the bribe; prior to 
enactment of the FCPA, the act was not illegal and the fiduciary therefore 
did not violate a duty. But we do not deem bribery corrupt because it is 
illegal; we have made it illegal because it is corrupt. As the legislative 
history shows, congressional debates focused on the question of whether 
to prohibit this form of corruption, not whether we should consider the 
conduct corrupt. Black’s definition, which precedes these debates by 
decades, does not capture our more modern sense. 
The second reason Black’s definition fails is that it does not capture our 
sense of who the victims of bribery truly are. The victim of a breach of 
fiduciary duty is the principal—the company, its shareholders. Although 
shareholders are among the victims of FCPA violations, as evidenced by 
contemporary shareholder suits, once again this is true only because we 
have made bribery illegal. But bribery had its victims long before the 
FCPA was enacted, and we enacted it in very large part to protect those 
victims. Commentators have generally acknowledged that overseas 
 
 
 147. Bribery Act, 2010, ch. 23 (U.K.). 
 148. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 34, § 1 (U.K.). See also Joint Committee 
on the Draft Corruption Bill, Report 2002-3, H.L., H.C., HL Paper 157, HC 705, para. 3 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200203/jtselect/jtcorr/157/15702.htm. 
 149. See House of Commons Library, Bribery Bill [HL], Bill No 69 § 2.3 (H.C. Research Paper 
10/19, 2010) (U.K), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2010/ 
rp10-019.pdf. 
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corporate bribery has two kinds of victims: the citizens of corrupt regimes, 
whose regulations are circumvented and whose safety and prosperity are 
thereby jeopardized,
150
 and the companies who comply with anti-bribery 
norms only to lose business to noncompliant companies.
151
 Defining the 
victims of bribery in this way, Black’s definition fails to capture that the 
payor has done anything harmful. 
To divine the third reason for the failure of Black’s, consider who has 
engaged in the wrongful conduct under its definition, and consequently 
who is liable. Officials and fiduciaries evidently bear liability for 
violations under the definition—they are the only ones who have violated 
a duty. But in the vast majority of settled FCPA cases, the defendant is 
neither an official nor a fiduciary; it is a corporation. Because Black’s 
definition tacitly limits private-actor liability to fiduciaries, a corporation, 
much like a sole proprietor, cannot be liable. This plainly contradicts our 
contemporary sense of corruption.  
Accordingly, I want to propose a new definition of corruption, one that 
corrects each of the deficiencies in Black’s. That definition is:  
“Conduct by a public or private actor that is intended to procure 
some benefit, either personally or for someone else, the granting of 
which would contravene official or fiduciary duty and the rights of 
others.”  
By this definition, any private individual, whether natural or juridical, may 
engage in corruption. Such private conduct is not narrowly tied to 
fiduciary duty: although the granting of the benefit may be wrong by 
virtue of a fiduciary breach, the bribe payor need not violate a fiduciary 
duty, or even be a fiduciary, to engage in corruption. The granting of the 
benefit must violate either an official or fiduciary duty: officials are 
prohibited from accepting bribes in virtually every jurisdiction in the 
world; and the definition includes fiduciaries to encompass private-sector 
forms of corruption. Accordingly, by this definition, a company that bribes 
 
 
 150. Philip Segal, Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 169, 172 (2006); Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 689, 691–94 (2000).  
 151. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interest: International Legalization in 
the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141, S167 (2002); David A. Gantz, Globalizing 
Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus, 18 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 457, 461 (1998); Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Note, Combating Foreign Bribery: 
Legislative Reform in the United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global Enforcement, 49 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 365, 367–68 (2011). See also Corruption Data, TRANSPARENCY INT’L 
U.K., http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption-data (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
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an overseas official for business purposes has engaged in an act of 
corruption.  
This definition not only captures our modern sense of the word, but as 
the next Part shows, it also captures our philosophical legacy.  
B. Rediscovering Corruption as a Violation of Natural Rights 
Rooting a theory of international human rights in a particular 
philosophical tradition proves culturally sensitive, but necessary. As the 
United Nations went to work drafting the 1948 Universal of Declaration of 
Human Rights—the first document purporting to make a statement of 
universal human rights with the support of nearly all nations of the 
world—it solicited contributions from thinkers of various cultural and 
philosophical traditions: American, European, Chinese, Indian, Middle 
Eastern, and others.
152
 The committee was astonished to find that despite 
the radically divergent philosophical underpinnings, the core principles 
were present in many cultural and religious traditions.
153
 The subgroup 
charged with drafting the document, the U.N. Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), would come to believe that peoples 
could agree on what rights were, even if they could not agree on the proper 
philosophical justification for them. As one UNESCO drafter reportedly 
quipped, “we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us 
why.”154  
Louis Henkin would similarly write that in the modern era, “[t]he 
justification of human rights is rhetorical, not philosophical” and that the 
idea of human rights “does not ground or justify itself . . . in any . . . 
political theory.”155 But be that as it may, this Article is disinclined toward 
rhetorical exercises; it seeks a deeper philosophical foundation for the 
rights claim, even if it requires making the somewhat unfashionable choice 
of a particular philosophical tradition.  
With some embarrassment, we should probably concede that cultural 
preferences are at present built into anti-bribery enforcement itself. 
Though corruption prohibitions are increasingly garnering universal 
support, it is a regrettable truth that the vast majority of enforcement 
activity now occurs in what might loosely be deemed the Anglo-Saxon 
 
 
 152. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 73 (2001).  
 153. Id. at 76. 
 154. Id. at 77. 
 155. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2 (1990). 
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world. The U.S. has taken the lead in enforcement, which is why most of 
this Article concerns the U.S. statute. The second most newsworthy 
enforcement jurisdiction today is probably the U.K., which passed a new 
statute in 2010 with which MNCs around the world are now struggling to 
comply. A distant third (and indeed, a distant relative of the modern 
Anglo-Saxon world) might be Germany, which has worked with the U.S. 
to bring significant fines against corporate bribe-payors.
156
  
Accordingly, I base this Article’s rights argument in the Anglo-Saxon 
philosophical tradition, particularly the foundational rights philosophy of 
John Locke. As a British philosopher whose ideas provided the foundation 
for the later U.S. revolution against Britain, Locke’s thinking has exerted 
the dominant intellectual influence on thinking about rights. And natural 
law theory, tracing its origins to Locke, is again the topic of a vibrant 
intellectual debate within the legal academy, engaged in by such 
luminaries as Randy Barnett, Richard Epstein, and Jeremy Waldron.
157
  
Though Locke did not use the term, the concept as herein defined—
conduct by a public or private actor that is intended to procure some 
benefit, either personally or for someone else, the granting of which would 
contravene official or fiduciary duty and the rights of others—pervaded his 
rights theory. Locke holds that we can discern the function of government 
by first reflecting on what the human condition is or would be in its 
absence. Locke posits a natural condition of “freedom to order their 
actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, 
within the bounds of the law of Nature.”158 In this condition of natural 
freedom, we also live in a state of “equality, wherein all the power and 
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another.”159 Each being 
free and equal, with none possessing a greater jurisdiction than another, 
the enforcement of the law is “put into every man’s hands, whereby every 
one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as 
may hinder its violation.”160 Although humans thus have a natural right to 
 
 
 156. Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Korruption [Anti-Corruption Act], August 19, 1997, BGBl. I at 
2038. 
 157. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Imperative of Natural Rights in Today’s World (Boston 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 03-20, 
2003); Richard Epstein, The Natural Law Bridge Between Private Law and Public International Law, 
13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47 (2012); Jeremy Waldron, What is Natural Law Like? (NYU Sch. of Law, 
Research Paper No. 12-27, 2012); Jeremy Waldron, The Decline of the Natural Right (NYU Sch. of 
Law, Research Paper No. 09-38, 2009). 
 158. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 8 (Prometheus Books ed. 
1986). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 10. 
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liberty and equality, we would not yet speak of a right to be free of 
corruption. Corruption as defined above could not occur; because there is 
no government in the state of nature, there are no official duties and thus 
no granting of benefits in contravention of those duties.  
But natural liberty and natural equality turn out to be rather 
incompatible, as the latter ruins the former. Experience teaches that “it is 
unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will 
make men partial to themselves and their friends; and, on the other side, 
ill-nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others, 
and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow.”161 In seeking to 
protect our own rights under color of enforcing the law of nature, we tend 
to encroach upon the rights of others. What is lacking in the state of nature 
is a “common measure to decide all controversies,” “a known and 
indifferent” source of power.162 The precariousness of our natural freedom 
induces us to establish a government, the defining purpose of which is to 
“be the remedy of those evils which necessarily follow from men being 
judges in their own cases.”163 
At this moment, having established a government that preserves the 
freedom that in nature is violated, civil society begins.  
Those who are united into one body, and have a common 
established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide 
controversies between them . . . are in civil society one with 
another; but those who have no such common appeal . . . are still in 
the state of Nature.
164
  
The difference between civil society and the state of nature is the existence 
of a government that is “bound to govern by established standing laws, 
promulgated and known by the people, and not by extemporary 
decrees.”165 And this government, thus constituted, must be “directed to no 
other end than the peace, safety, and public good of the people.”166 Indeed, 
the very definition of legitimate political power is the “right of making 
laws, with penalties of death and all less penalties . . . only for the public 
good.”167  
 
 
 161. Id. at 13. 
 162. Id. at 70. 
 163. Id. at 13. 
 164. Id. at 49. 
 165. Id. at 72. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at 8. 
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Civil society, instituted by creating a government, thus makes possible 
a freedom that could not exist in the state of nature. This conclusion is 
ironic, given Locke’s strong claim of natural freedom. But the irony is not 
lost on Locke, and he responds:  
If man in the state of Nature be so free . . . why will he part with his 
freedom . . . and subject himself to the dominion and control of any 
other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the 
state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very 
uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others . . . the 
enjoyment of his property is very unsafe, very insecure . . . full of 
fears and continual dangers.
168
 
Locke fully recognizes that though freedom exists in nature, full freedom 
is only realized in civil society: “the end of law is not to abolish or 
restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom.”169 Put another way, “[f]or 
in all the states of created beings, capable of laws, where there is no law 
there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence 
from others, which cannot be where there is no law.”170 Liberty, to which 
we are entitled by nature, can therefore only exist under a properly 
constituted government.  
To the extent that the government rules by standing laws, known by 
and promulgated to the people and directed to the public good, our natural 
right to liberty is protected and enjoyed. To the extent that the government 
rules otherwise, the right is violated or, to use Locke’s term, “invaded.” 
Thus he writes, “[t]he liberty of man in society is to be under no other 
legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, 
nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that 
legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it.”171 And freedom, by 
definition, is “to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of 
that society, and made by the legislative power . . . not to be subject to the 
inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man.”172 
At this point the relationship between natural rights and corruption 
becomes clear. Locke’s freedom, though natural, can only exist where 
government confers benefits in accordance with the official duty to govern 
by standing rules directed to the common good. The natural right to liberty 
 
 
 168. Id. at 69. 
 169. Id. at 33. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at 17. 
 172. Id.  
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is thus violated when officials confer benefits in contravention of standing 
law, official duty, and the public good. Note the striking similarity 
between this basic and uncontroversial Lockean reading, and this Article’s 
definition of corruption: “Conduct by a public or private actor that is 
intended to procure some benefit, either personally or for someone else, 
the granting of which would contravene official or fiduciary duty and the 
rights of others.” Official conduct that procures a benefit in violation of 
official duty, and contrary to the rights of others, is but another way of 
describing the failure to govern by standing laws directed to the public 
good. Where the government has ceased to rule by standing laws without 
preference, where benefits are granted contrary to official duty and the 
rights of others, citizens “have no such decisive power to appeal to, [and] 
they are still in the state of Nature.”173 Corruption thus voids the social 
contract, destroys government, and returns society to a state of nature. 
Indeed, when Locke defines tyranny as “making use of the power any one 
has in his hands not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own 
private, separate advantage,”174 he is describing corruption by a different 
name. 
C. Rejecting the Modern View of Corruption as Merely a Means of 
Violating Rights  
The Lockean philosophy of natural rights temporarily fell out of 
fashion with the end of the Enlightenment, displaced by the utilitarianism 
of Jeremy Bentham
175
 and John Stuart Mill.
176
 Nations, particularly the 
United States, came to embrace utilitarianism as philosophical justification 
for the rise of the welfare state,
177
 and by the early twentieth century rights 
talk had substantially receded. However, this would change in dramatic 
fashion with World War II and the Holocaust, which reignited interest in 
the proposition that irrespective of aggregate happiness, there are some 
things that governments simply may not do.  
Though the more pluralistic intellectual climate would favor the less 
sectarian philosophy of Immanuel Kant,
178
 Lockean themes are still 
 
 
 173. Id. at 50. 
 174. Id. at 108. See also id. at 109 (“Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed 
to another’s harm.”). 
 175. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (1789). 
 176. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863). 
 177. HENKIN, supra note 155, at 5. 
 178. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785). 
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evident in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 3 
provides that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person.”179 Article 10 provides that “Everyone is entitled in full equality to 
a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the 
determination of his rights and obligations . . . .”180 Government is, of 
course, to be neutral; the Declaration affirms the right not to be subject to 
what Locke called “the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of 
another man.”181 Article 29 provides that  
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
182
  
This is but a restatement of the Lockean right to be subject to no restraint 
save that which a duly constituted government has established for the 
public good. And of course, these claims to rights are universal, as Article 
28 provides that “[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international order 
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realized.”183  
The Declaration thus contemplates an international order in which 
relations between nations further protect these rights. Though the 
Declaration does not use the word “corruption,” the concept is there by 
another name. In reacting against tyranny it defines legitimate 
government, and in so doing articulates those themes that the above 
analysis shows are fundamentally about corruption. 
Despite this modern invocation of anti-corruption themes, 
contemporary anti-corruption writings have not yet embraced the principle 
that corruption is an inherent rights violation, asserting instead that 
corruption is merely the means of violating rights. The leading anti-
corruption NGO, Transparency International, teamed with the 
International Council on Human Rights Policy to author what is perhaps 
the defining modern work on the relationship between corruption and 
rights. In Corruption and Human Rights: Making the Connection,
184
 they 
 
 
 179. UDHR, supra note 113, art. 3. 
 180. Id. art. 10. 
 181. See supra text accompanying note 172.  
 182. UDHR, supra note 113, art. 29. 
 183. Id. art. 28. 
 184. MAKING THE CONNECTION, supra note 127. 
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argue that “the cycle of corruption facilitates, perpetuates and 
institutionalises [sic] human rights violations.”185 Acknowledging the 
possibility of framing corruption as an inherent violation, the document 
instead “takes a different approach” by applying “human rights principles 
and methods usefully in anti-corruption programmes.”186 They 
acknowledge that “where corruption is widespread, states cannot comply 
with their human rights obligations,”187 but ultimately find that the most 
direct connection between corruption and human rights exists where “a 
corrupt act is deliberately used as a means to violate a right.”188 
The means-ends framework now dominates the academic 
scholarship,
189
 and can be traced to what may be the foundational 
academic work on the relationship between corruption and human rights, 
Professor Ndiva Kofele-Kale’s, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as 
an Individual and Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption 
to a Crime Under International Law.
190
 Kofele-Kale comes close to seeing 
corruption as an inherent violation, but ultimately stops just shy of that 
mark. He begins by asserting that the “right to a corruption-free society” is 
a “fundamental human right; a right that should be recognized as a 
 
 
 185. Id. at vi. 
 186. Id. at 3. 
 187. Id. at 23. 
 188. Id. at 27. See also Andreanna M. Truelove, Note, Oil, Diamonds, and Sunlight: Fostering 
Human Rights Through Transparency in Revenues from Natural Resources, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 207 
(2003) (“Government corruption provides both an incentive and a means for human rights 
violations.”). 
 189. See MARTINE BOERSMA, CORRUPTION: A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND A CRIME 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW? 202–64 (2012) (enumerating the various specific and already-
recognized rights that corruption violates); C. RAJ KUMAR, CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INDIA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSPARENCY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 42 (2011) (“The 
first step in developing a theoretical framework for recognizing corruption as a human rights issue is to 
examine the different types of human rights that are affected through corruption.”); John Hatchard, 
Adopting a Human Rights Approach Towards Combating Corruption, in CORRUPTION & HUMAN 
RIGHTS: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Martine Boersma & Hans Nelen eds., 2010); Magdalena 
Supelveda Carmona & Julio Bacio-Terracino, Corruption and Human Rights: Making the Connection, 
in CORRUPTION & HUMAN RIGHTS, supra; James Thuo Gathi, Defining the Relationship Between 
Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 125 (2009); Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Change or the 
Illusion of Change: the War Against Official Corruption in Africa, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 697 
(2006); Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through International Law in 
Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 691 (2007); Kenny Feng, The Human Rights 
Implications of Corruption: An Alien Tort Claims Act-Based Analysis 1 (Wharton Undergraduate 
Research Scholars, Research Paper No. WH-299-301, 2004). For scholars who are more skeptical of 
the effort to frame corruption as a human rights problem, see, e.g., Morag Goodwin & Kate Rose-
Sender, Linking Corruption and Human Rights: An Unwelcome Addition to the Development 
Discourse, in CORRUPTION & HUMAN RIGHTS, supra. 
 190. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective 
Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime Under International Law, 34 INT’L LAW. 149 
(2000) [hereinafter Kofele-Kale, Elevating]. 
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component part of the right to economic self-determination and the right to 
development.”191 He first invokes the Kantian language that human rights 
are “derived from the belief that all human beings are born equal in dignity 
and rights, and that these moral claims are inalienable and inherent in all 
human individuals by virtue of their humanity.”192 He also marries the 
asserted right to earlier social contract theory, arguing that “the owners of 
these evidently basic rights of humankind—life, liberty and property—
have never surrendered them to the state. Rather, all that the individual 
surrenders to the state upon entering civil society is the right to have these 
rights enforced by the state.”193 
Kofele-Kale never fully articulates the precise reason why corruption 
violates a right, thus remaining stuck in corruption-as-means analysis. He 
makes significant progress when asserting that “life, dignity, and other 
important human values depend on” a government free from corruption.194 
Kofele-Kale further argues that the right “flows from” the “right to 
economic self-determination.”195 While this is true, it does not quite 
establish corruption as an inherent rights violation. Kofele-Kale has 
identified a close connection between corruption and other rights, but that 
which “flows from” a right is not necessarily a right. In this same vein, he 
finds that corruption “also implicates the collective right to development,” 
that economic development “will better enable a country to guarantee the 
economic and social rights of its inhabitants,” and that “societal 
development is essential for individual development which is necessary to 
enable individuals to know their rights, to claim them, to realize and to 
enjoy them and the human dignity they promise.”196 Again, though the 
relationship between corruption and development is persuasive and 
compelling, it does little to establish corruption as an inherent rights 
violation.  
Kofele-Kale ultimately argues that freedom from corruption “can be 
viewed as a freestanding, autonomous right,”197 and his analysis gets us 
partway there.
198
 So too are other scholars locked into a means-end 
 
 
 191. Id. at 152. 
 192. Id. at 163. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 163–64. 
 196. Id. at 165. See also Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. 
GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986). 
 197. Kofele-Kale, Elevating, supra note 190, at 152. 
 198. See also Nihal Jayawickrama, The Impact of Corruption on Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (2006), 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/HR.POL.GG. 
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conception of the relationship between corruption and human rights.
199
 
The present Article aspires to move the academic literature forward by 
drawing on Lockean thought to demonstrate that freedom from corruption 
can, and should, be understood as a foundational human right, indeed the 
defining right of civil society.  
III. A NEW CORNERSTONE: REBUILDING CORPORATE LIABILITY AFTER 
KIOBEL 
The ATS was always a strange candidate to serve as the cornerstone of 
a federal statutory regime for deterring overseas corporate rights 
violations. But we would not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, 
seizing upon that ambiguous statute because it seemed the best available 
for pursuing this compelling goal. 
That perception is wrong-headed. This Part argues that the ATS never 
has been and, after Kiobel, never will be the principal federal statute by 
which corporations are held liable for overseas human rights violations. 
The FCPA represents a better statutory model for deterring overseas, 
rights-related corporate misconduct. Post-Kiobel, scholars should come to 
recognize the FCPA as the principal federal statute for deterring such 
conduct, and should direct their energies to better understanding how the 
FCPA can more effectively achieve this goal.  
Part III.A will compare the two statutes to illustrate how the FCPA is a 
more legally sound and practically effective cornerstone on which to build 
a federal statutory regime of corporate liability for human rights abuses. 
But if the FCPA is to fully achieve its goal, two sets of reforms are 
needed: first, we must develop a scheme for remedying the harms that 
known incidences of large-scale corporate bribery caused; and second, we 
must work more effectively to create uniform enforcement among the 
capital-exporting nations. But neither of these reforms is unprecedented in 
federal law: to discern the first we can look to environmental law, and for 
the second to intellectual property.  
 
 
SEM.2006.BP.1.pdf (“[T]he campaign to contain corruption and the movement for the promotion and 
protection of human rights are not disparate processes. They are inextricably linked and 
interdependent.”); Truelove, supra note 188, at 207. 
 199. See generally Gaathi, supra note 189; Kofele-Kale, supra note 189; Snider & Kidane, supra 
note 189; Feng, supra note 189. 
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A. The FCPA as the ATS Might Have Been 
The ATS has been the crux of what Harold Koh famously called 
“transnational legal process,” in which domestic courts are used to develop 
standards of international law.
200
 Koh argued that bringing suits under 
international law in U.S. courts result in the development, and perhaps the 
incorporation, of international human rights norms into U.S. law.
201
 His 
followers urged usage of this strategy to create a “dialogic process of 
transnational judicial dialogue itself—of interaction, interpretation, and 
internalization among the world’s judges—that ensures the generation and 
proliferation of norms that are ‘legitimate’ on the international plane.”202 
The ATS has been widely thought to provide a means of achieving this 
goal and indeed, among U.S. statutes is perhaps uniquely situated to do so. 
But the ATS’s strength may have proven to be its liability. The process 
of incorporating international human rights standards into U.S. law 
through the ATS has yielded a number of legal issues that go to the very 
essence of the statute’s purpose. Scholars, litigants, and judges have 
vigorously disputed such fundamental questions as why Congress enacted 
the statute in the first place; the origin of its cause of action; whether 
jurisdiction is universal; whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Morrison,
203
 
should apply to the ATS, and if so, to what extent; whether liability 
extends to corporations or is limited to natural persons; what the ATS’s 
impact on foreign relations could be; and whether that impact should be 
relevant to the courts’ construction of its application.204 The ATS has thus 
 
 
 200. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, 
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)); Harold Hongju Koh, Lecture, How is 
International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1413–14 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Address, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 646–
55, 663–66 (1998).  
 201. Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, supra note 200, at 1415–16. 
 202. Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the “New” Schools: Assessing the Legitimacy of 
International Legal Norms Created by Domestic Courts, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 455, 463 (2007). 
 203. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 204. See generally Supplemental Brief of Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 
(2012) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 2165340; Special Feature: Kiobel Symposium, SCOTUSBLOG (July 
6–26, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/kiobel-symposium/. For the foreign 
policy debate specifically, see, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International 
Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492 (2004); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687 (2004). 
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proven to be a rather shaky foundation on which to build a regime of 
corporate liability for overseas human rights violations.  
The FCPA, by contrast, is vulnerable to none of these disputes. It 
eschews the attempted incorporation of international law into federal 
common law by the federal judiciary in favor of a clear congressional 
directive based on undisputed constitutional authority and well-established 
common-law liability.  
The first U.S. Congress enacted the ATS as part of the 1789 Judiciary 
Act, the full text providing merely that “district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”205 From its 
enactment until 1980, the law was invoked only twenty-one times,
206
 and 
only two courts had ever upheld jurisdiction under the statute.
207
 With the 
watershed case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
208
 in 1980, the statute found new 
life and perhaps even assumed a new identity: an instrument for allowing 
aliens to hold persons liable for overseas human rights abuses in U.S. 
courts.  
From 1997 until 2010, the courts regularly used the ATS to hold 
corporate defendants liable for rights violations.
209
 Though the Supreme 
Court had subtly raised the question of whether corporations could be 
liable in a footnote to its only decision on the ATS,
210
 no lower court 
accepted the court’s invitation to overturn corporate liability until 2011. 
Then, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,
211
 the Second Circuit heard the 
appeal of a Nigerian national who has sued three international companies 
for allegedly arranging with the Nigerian government to militarily 
suppress resistance to the companies’ oil drilling. The Second Circuit held 
that corporations are not liable under the ATS because the principle of 
corporate liability has not been established specifically in international 
law.
212
  
The Supreme Court granted Kiobel’s writ of certiorari and held an 
initial hearing in February 2011 on the question of whether corporations 
 
 
 205. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 206. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into the 
Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4–5 n.15 (1985). 
 207. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 
1795) (No. 1067). 
 208. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 209. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 210. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004). 
 211. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 212. Id. at 145. 
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could be liable for human rights violations under customary international 
law. During the hearing, some justices expressed concern about whether 
the statute authorized U.S. courts to hear cases alleging violations of 
international law that occurred on foreign soil, and the Court took the 
extraordinary step of ordering a second round of briefing and argument to 
explore that precise topic.
213
 Though Congress plainly has the 
constitutional authority to enact statutes with application beyond the U.S. 
borders,
214
 courts have developed a presumption against extraterritorial 
application that may only be rebutted by “the affirmative intention of the 
Congress clearly expressed” in the language of the relevant act.215 The 
Supreme Court affirmed this presumption in 2010, finding that Section 10-
b of the 1934 Exchange Act lacked such a statement of congressional 
intent and therefore did not provide a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs 
suing a foreign company for fraud in relation to securities purchased on a 
foreign exchange.
216
  
The Supreme Court in Sosa ominously warned of courts using the ATS 
to “claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their own 
citizens.”217 That warning proved prescient. The Court’s April 2013 Kiobel 
opinion never even reached corporate liability under international law, 
instead ruling entirely on extraterritorial application. Finding that “the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, 
and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption,” the Nigerian 
petitioners’ claim was barred.218 In dicta, the Court further stated that for 
an ATS claim to be valid, the conduct in question must “touch and 
concern” the territory of the U.S. with “sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.”219 But although the Court 
provided almost no guidance on how that test should apply in practice, the 
vast majority of the cases historically brought under the ATS would 
almost certainly fail this test. Kiobel thus does not quite eliminate liability 
for overseas rights violations, but comes terribly close. 
By contrast, there may be no better example of a clear expression of 
affirmative intention to apply extraterritorially than the FCPA. The statute 
 
 
 213. Oral Argument at 10:02, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (No. 10-1491), 
available at http://harvardhumanrights.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/10-1491rearg.pdf. 
 214. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Congress has the authority to 
enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875, 2883 (2010). 
 217. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).  
 218. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
 219. Id. at 1669. 
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prohibits making payments to “foreign officials,”220 and this is understood 
by all to routinely occur on foreign soil. Moreover, unlike the ATS, the 
FCPA’s legislative history makes abundantly clear that the statute is 
designed specifically to address bribes that actually did occur there. 
Indeed, the FCPA represents the quintessential congressional grant of 
extraterritorial application that the Supreme Court did not find in the 
Exchange Act or the ATS.  
One can imagine, however, an ATS case involving a corporate 
defendant that did indeed satisfy the touch and concern test. That case 
would likely then become the occasion to revisit the original question 
before the Court of corporate liability. And this issue remains highly 
unsettled. In the wake of the Second Circuit’s ruling, scholars and 
advocates have raised a staggering number of sub-issues on which little 
agreement seems to exist. Did the framers who ratified the 1789 Judiciary 
Act intend to exempt any class of defendant?
221
 Does the proper source 
today for determining whether corporations are liable lie in international or 
federal common law?
222
 If the former, is corporate liability now 
recognized in international human rights law?
223
 Is corporate liability even 
desirable as a matter of policy,
224
 and would it promote or deter investment 
in developing countries?
225
 Here, the weaknesses of transnational legal 
process are perhaps clearest; looking to international law to establish 
corporate liability has proven a minefield. 
The FCPA does not invite such disputation. There is no doubt that both 
juridical and natural persons may be both civilly and criminally liable for 
 
 
 220. FCPA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), - 2(a), - 3(a) (2012). 
 221. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History William R. Casto, Martin S. Flaherty, 
Robert W. Gordon, Nasser Hussain, and John v. Orth in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 2165340. 
 222. See Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of 
Affirmance, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 
2161290. 
 223. See Brief of Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (No. 10-1491), 
2012 WL 2165340. 
 224. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien Tort 
Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161 (2012). 
 225. See Brief of Joseph E. Stiglitz as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Mohamad v. 
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2011) (Nos. 11-88, 10-1491), 2011 WL 6813580 (arguing that 
ATS enforcement promotes long-term investment and economic growth); Brief of the Clearing House 
Ass’n L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 738 (No. 10-1491) 
(arguing that aiding-and-abetting claims discourage corporations from doing business in developing 
countries); Brief For the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 738 (No. 10-1491) (also arguing deterrence). 
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violations. The statute makes this explicit,
226
 and is supported by a century 
of case law that has extended criminal liability to corporations.
227
 While 
questions remain concerning whether criminal law specifically may deter 
investment in developing countries, these disputes are academic and 
would gain no traction in a court of law. And even among academics, 
there is no question that corporations must be at least civilly liable if the 
statute is to have any meaning whatsoever. But more to the point, none can 
deny that the statute makes both civil and criminal liability explicit and 
that they both rest on the sound legal footing of congressional enactment, 
constitutional authority, and well-established case law.  
But even if none of these legal vulnerabilities existed, one would still 
wonder how effective the ATS had ever become in deterring overseas 
corporate misconduct. Admittedly, the ATS has played an important role 
in the recent global development of enforceable human rights norms.
228
 
But prior to and independently of Kiobel, federal courts had begun to 
constrain the ability of plaintiffs to sue corporate defendants, principally 
through pleading standards, forum non conveniens, and exhaustion of 
remedies requirements.
229
 Though ATS filings continue in federal court, 
the vast majority have resulted in favorable rulings for the defendant and 
only a relative handful seem to have settled.
230
 Indeed, one scholar 
recently characterized the chances for plaintiffs to receive meaningful 
restitution under the ATS as “dim.”231 
Perhaps for this reason, among corporate law firms one observes very 
little attention paid to compliance with the ATS, creating a dramatic 
contrast with what has facetiously been called “FCPA Inc.”232 Though 
such firms might briefly mention recent decisions on their websites,
233
 one 
will rarely see these firms sponsoring compliance training seminars for the 
ATS. Exactly the opposite has proven true for the FCPA. Anti-bribery 
compliance has become among the most rapidly-growing practice areas of 
 
 
 226. FCPA 28 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1)—(2) (2012). 
 227. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962). 
 228. Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56 
RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 971 (2004). 
 229. See Childress, supra note 4. 
 230. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends 
and Out-of Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456 (2011); Michael 
Goldhaber, The Life and Death of the Corporate Alien Tort, THE AM. LAWYER (Oct. 12, 2010), 
available at http:/www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleINtl.jsp?id=1202473215797. 
 231. Childress, supra note 4, at 725. 
 232. Joe Palazollo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2012, at B1. 
 233. See, e.g., Alien Tort Statute, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, http://www.omm.com/alientort 
statute/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). 
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the last decade, as compliance training opportunities abound and firms 
develop specialty FCPA practice groups. The rise of this industry is due in 
large part to the FCPA’s proven record to obtain, and collect, settlements 
against multinational companies in the tens or hundreds of millions of 
dollars and on occasion even surpassing $1 billion.
234
 While actual 
compliance with a given statute is difficult to quantify, to the extent that 
publicly-advertised corporate compliance training may be taken as a rough 
gauge of corporate concern there can be no doubt that the FCPA has 
induced corporate compliance in a way that the ATS never did. 
In comparing these two statutes’ capacity to deter rights violations, the 
very different rights that each statute touches will immediately rise into 
relief. Under the ATS, plaintiffs have typically brought suit for the most 
egregious of rights violations: kidnapping,
235
 torture,
236
 arbitrary 
detention,
237
 murder,
238
 genocide,
239
 slavery,
240
 sexual assault,
241
 and 
others.
242
 Causes of actions for these violations could obviously never be 
brought under an anti-bribery statute; admittedly, this represents a 
limitation in the use of the FCPA as a human rights tool.  
But we should not discount those rights violations that an anti-bribery 
statute does indeed touch, both directly and indirectly. As this Article has 
already shown, bribery should be regarded in the first instance as an 
inherent rights violation.
243
 And as the two case studies illustrated above, 
bribery is also a tool by which a number of other rights violations occur: 
the right to equal protection before the law, to political representation, to 
self-determination, to food, housing, and medical care, to education, to 
equal access to a country’s public services, to safe working conditions, and 
to control natural resources.
244
 While perhaps not as dramatic as the ATS 
rights, or as harmful to any given individual victim, the FCPA rights are 
more pervasive and more systematic, impacting a far broader cross-section 
of society, and the world, than the ATS rights ever have. While I would 
 
 
 234. See Richard L. Cassin, Who Will Crack the Top Ten?, THE FCPA BLOG (Aug. 3, 2012, 11:18 
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/8/3/who-will-crack-the-top-ten.html.  
 235. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 236. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 237. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 238. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012); Habyarimana v. Kagame, 696 F.3d 
1029 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 239. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 240. See Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 241. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 242. See, e.g., Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort Statute, 
and Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 32–33 (2007).  
 243. See supra Part I.B. 
 244. See supra Part II.C. 
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not suggest that the ATS rights are somehow less important or deserving 
of redress, this Article does argue that effectively reducing violations of 
those rights that the FCPA touches would constitute no less significant an 
achievement. 
The FCPA thus provides a welcome alternative to the transnational 
legal process of the ATS. Rather than asking the courts to discern ill-
defined international standards and incorporate them in to federal common 
law, Congress exercised its constitutional authority to engage both the 
executive and judicial branches in the enforcement and interpretation of a 
relatively straightforward statutory prohibition. The bribery prohibition 
can more fully achieve its potential as a human rights tool with two 
specific amendments, as the next Parts describe. 
B. Compensating Victims by Following the Precedent of Environmental 
Law 
Though the FCPA can thus address the rights violations that a majority 
of the world’s population faces daily, this Article has shown that the 
FCPA has fallen far short of its potential to improve the legal and social 
conditions victims.
245
 The first step in remedying this problem lies in using 
enforcement mechanisms to compensate the communities victimized by 
large-scale corporate corruption. 
Outside the U.S., the idea of compensating victims of international 
corporate bribery has gained some traction; in particular, the U.K. has 
twice endorsed the idea publicly. When the British defense contractor 
BAE entered into a £30 million settlement in connection with illicit 
payments in Tanzania,
246
 the sentencing judge declared that the “real 
victims” of these bribes were the people of Tanzania.247 Accordingly, the 
SFO, the Department for International Development (DFID), the 
Government of Tanzania, and BAE eventually agreed that most of the 
settlement would be used to fund educational projects in Tanzania, 
including the purchase of desks, textbooks and teacher instruction manuals 
for elementary schools.
248
 Then-Director of the SFO, Richard Alderman, 
 
 
 245. See supra Part I.B. 
 246. See Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, BAE Systems Plc (Feb. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2010/bae-systems-plc.aspx. 
 247. See Adam Greaves, Tanzania Urged to Prosecute Over the BAE Systems Bribery Claim, THE 
FRAUD BOARD (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.thefraudboard.com/public-officials/tanzania-urged-to-
prosecute-over-the-bae-systems-bribery-claim/. 
 248. See Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, BAE Systems Will Pay Towards Educating 
Children in Tanzania After Signing an Agreement Brokered by the Serious Fraud Office (Mar. 15, 
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described it as providing “a satisfactory outcome for all concerned but 
most of all for the Tanzanian people.”249 Similarly, when the British 
engineering firm of Mabey & Johnson paid £6.6 million in criminal fines 
for bribes allegedly paid in Jamaica and Ghana, the UK returned a portion 
of those funds to the people of those countries, declaring, “[t]he SFO is 
committed to the interests of the victims of overseas corporate 
corruption.”250 
One would search in vain for any such quotations from U.S. 
enforcement officials. The DOJ and SEC simply have not embraced the 
notion that the fines and penalties from FCPA enforcement actions should 
benefit bribery’s victims. But this is not because victims groups have not 
tried. Specifically, two approaches have been attempted, both of which are 
bound to fail. This Part will describe those attempts and then propose a 
more promising alternative, drawing on the example of environmental law. 
The first failed attempt involved certain victims seeking formal 
recognition under U.S. victims’ rights laws. These statutes emerged from 
the victims’ rights movement of the last couple of decades and are 
designed to afford the victims of federal crimes restitution and other 
rights. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), enacted as part 
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
251
 makes 
restitution mandatory
252
 (unlike its predecessor, the Victims Witness and 
Protection Act in which restitution was discretionary
253
). It defines 
“victim” to mean a “person directly and proximately harmed” as a result of 
a federal crime, and person is defined to include organizations.
254
 
Similarly, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004 affords several 
enumerated rights to victims, including the right to attend and to speak at 
criminal proceedings, the right to protection from the accused, and the 
 
 
2012), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/bae-
systems-will-pay-towards-educating-children-in-tanzania-after-signing-an-agreement-brokered-by-the-
serious-fraud-office.aspx. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Richard L. Cassin, Breakthrough in Britain, THE FCPA BLOG (Sept. 29, 2009, 8:02 PM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/9/30/breakthrough-in-britain.html (discussing the Mabey & 
Johnson settlement). 
 251. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 204(a), 110 
Stat. 1227 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (1996) 
(codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2267 (2000)).  
 252. MVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(1). 
 253. Victims Witness and Protection Act of 1996 (“VWPA”), Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 
(1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., with the restitution provision at 18 
U.S.C. § 3663 (2000)). 
 254. Id. § 3663A(2). 
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right to restitution.
255
 It too defines victims broadly to include both natural 
and legal persons directly and proximately harmed by the commission of a 
federal crime.
256
 Under these statutes, courts have accordingly ordered 
restitution to corporations,
257
 universities,
258
 neighborhood associations,
259
 
and government agencies.
260
  
These statutes were recently brought to bear on FCPA enforcement in 
the Alcatel-Lucent action, in which the French parent company and 
several of its subsidiaries paid $17 million to several officials in Costa 
Rica to obtain telecommunications contracts.
261
 The bribe recipients were 
employees of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, S.A. (“ICE”), the 
country’s government-run electricity and telecommunications provider. As 
France and the U.S. were concluding its joint investigation, ICE sought to 
compel the U.S. government to provide restitution on the grounds that ICE 
was entitled to be deemed a victim under various of these statutes.
262
 ICE 
argued in federal court that although certain of its employees had accepted 
bribes, the entity in general was the victim—it had awarded hundreds of 
millions of dollars in contracts fraudulently.
263
 The DOJ marshaled 
substantial evidence that regardless of which particular employees may 
have received Alcatel-Lucent’s bribes, “corruption at ICE was pervasive in 
the tender process and occurred at the highest reaches of ICE” such that 
awarding the agency victim status “would undermine the meaning and 
 
 
 255. Crime Victim Rights’ Act of 2004 (“CVRA”), Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2261 (2004) 
(codified as amended at 18 USC § 3771 (2006)). The CVRA was preceded by the Victims’ Rights and 
Restitution Act of 1990 (“VRRA”), Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat 4820 (1990) (codified at 42 USC 
§ 10606 (2000)), repealed by CVRA, 118 Stat. at 2264. 
 256. CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e). 
 257. See United States v. Cummings, 189 F. Supp. 2d 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding corporation 
entitled to restitution for losses sustained when it was required to file restated financial statements after 
a partner manipulated the corporation’s financial records). 
 258. United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that restitution to the university 
was appropriate in the prosecution of a dean and a state senator for honest services fraud and bribery 
wherein the senator’s agreement with the university caused it to suffer a financial loss of over 
$2 million). 
 259. United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that because police 
cars and condominium property were damaged during a police chase after a bank robbery, the 
damages sustained by the condominium association were a direct and proximate result of the bank 
robbery). 
 260. United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2002) (awarding to State); United States v. 
Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2004) (awarding to Medicare); United States v. Donaby, 349 F.3d 
1046 (7th Cir. 2003) (awarding to a police department); United States v. Senty-Haugen, 449 F.3d 862 
(8th Cir. 2006) (awarding to the IRS). 
 261. Petition for Writ of Mandamus Pursuant to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, United States v. 
Alcatel-Lucent France, SA, 688 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-12716, 11-12802) [hereinafter 
“Alcatel-Lucent Writ”]. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
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purpose behind these victim rights.”264 Indeed, both the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit agreed that 
the government agency was more accurately understood as a co-
conspirator than a victim.
265
 
Because this systemic and high-reaching corruption is undoubtedly 
typical of the government agencies in the developing countries where 
nearly all FCPA enforcement actions occur, the victims compensation 
statutes are bound to fail. Trying to identify the “victim” as the 
government agency that employed the bribe solicitors would thus seem an 
inherently doomed approach. The communities that these agencies purport 
to serve are the victims, not the agencies themselves; indeed, the 
communities are victims in large part because their governments serve 
them so poorly. Likely for this reason, the DOJ’s usage of the restitution 
remedy, while not unprecedented, has been practically nonexistent. Since 
the modern enforcement era began roughly ten years ago, the DOJ has 
only awarded restitution damages once, where the victim was the United 
States government itself
266
 rather than the developing countries in which 
FCPA enforcement actions almost invariably occur.
267
 
One might imagine, alternatively, that non-governmental, community-
based organizations could better represent the victims of bribery, but this 
too will fall short of the victims’ rights statutes. The inherent problem with 
deeming such community-based organizations as victims under these 
statutes is that the organizations are not themselves the victims. They 
would merely represent the victims. But the statutes require compensation 
directly to the victims, making no provision for awarding restitution to 
groups who advocate on the victims’ behalf. Though U.S. courts have 
deemed some non-governmental organizations victims under the statutes, 
these organizations were themselves the victims and had suffered direct 
and measureable harm: a neighborhood association received restitution 
from a bank robbery because the robbery damaged association property;
268
 
a university received restitution from a dean and state senator for honest 
 
 
 264. Government’s Response to Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad of Costa Rica’s Petition 
for Victim Status and Restitution at 7, Alcatel-Lucent, 688 F.3d 1301. 
 265. In re Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, No. 11-12708-G, at 2 (11th Cir. June 17, 2011) 
(citing U.S. v. Lazarenko, 624 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2010)), available at http://www.mediafire. 
com/?turaenl 2l0ppdz6. 
 266. United States v. Juan Diaz, No. 1:09-cr-20346-JEM (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2012). 
 267. In its more distant history, the U.S. awarded restitution two other times. See United States v. 
F.G. Mason Eng’g, B-90-29-JAC (D. Conn. Nov. 15,1990); United States v. Kenny Int’l Corp., 79-
CR-372 (D.C.C. Aug. 2, 1979). But again, those enforcement actions did not occur in developing 
countries; the victim governments were Germany and New Zealand (Cook Islands), respectively. 
 268. United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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services fraud where the senator’s agreement with the university caused it 
to suffer a substantial financial loss;
269
 a corporation’s stock dropped after 
restating its financials following the discovery of accounting fraud;
270
 and 
an insurance company was compensated for duplicative bills it paid.
271
 
These precedents are qualitatively different from bribery: the organizations 
were the victims, not merely the victims’ representatives. Because these 
statutes require a showing of “direct and proximate” harm to a discrete 
person or group of persons, they are inherently ill-suited to provide 
restitution to the victims of bribery. 
A second strategy, developed by a Nigerian NGO, proposed 
compensating community organizations not through victims’ rights 
statutes but through the reallocation of disgorged profits. The Socio-
Economic Rights and Accountability Project (“SERAP)272 sent a letter to 
the SEC
273
 in March of 2012 proposing this remedy on a case-by-case 
basis. Disgorgement requires corporations to forfeit the amount of “ill-
gotten gain” from bribery,274 deriving from principles of restitution 
whereby “a person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of 
another is required to make restitution to the other.”275 Although the FCPA 
contains no express disgorgement provision, beginning in 2004
276
 the SEC 
drew on its broader disgorgement authority
277
 to make the remedy a 
regular feature of FCPA enforcement actions.
278
 
Similarly, Matthew Turk has proposed directing disgorged profits from 
FCPA actions to the governments of the countries in which the bribery 
 
 
 269. United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 270. United States v. Cummings, 189 F. Supp. 2d 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
 271. United States v. Lisa, 152 Fed. Appx. 85 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 272. See SERAP, http://serap-nigeria.org/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
 273. See Alexander W. Sierck, African NGO Asks For Distribution Of FCPA Recoveries, THE 
FCPA BLOG (Mar. 16, 2012, 3:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/3/16/african-ngo-asks-
for-distribution-of-fcpa-recoveries.html (link to the letter from Alexander Sierck to Robert S. 
Khuzami, Dir. of the SEC Enforcement Division included in blog post).  
 274. See Matthew C. Turk, A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 325 (2013).  
 275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § I (1937) (“Unjust Enrichment”). See also Turk, 
supra note 274, at 14–16. 
 276. See SEC v. ABB Ltd., No. 1:04-cv-01141 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 277. For a discussion of the SEC’s disgorgement authority and its uneasy relationship to the 
FCPA, see David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, 
and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and 
Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 478 (2009); see also Turk, supra note 274, at 12–14. 
 278. See Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA 
Enforcement, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.shearman.com/en/news 
insights/publications/2009/10/recent-trends-and-patterns-in-fcpa-enforcement. 
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occurred.
279
 Noting that FCPA disgorgement has deposited over $1 billion 
directly in the U.S. Treasury,
280
 he suggests using those funds instead to 
enhance local anti-bribery enforcement to “restrict the demand-side of 
corruption.”281 Where the local governments are too corrupt to be trusted 
with these monies, Turk proposes depositing the funds with the OECD 
Working Group
282
 to improve its efforts to monitor implementation of the 
OECD Convention.
283
 
Although the SEC replied to the disgorgement proposal with a polite 
but noncommittal letter,
284
 using disgorged profits in this way may at first 
blush seem possible under the SEC’s statutory grant of disgorgement 
authority. The disgorgement power derives from the 1990 Penny Stock 
Reform Act, which amended the 1934 Securities Act.
285
 This authority 
was then modified in 2002 by Sarbanes-Oxley
286
 to provide the SEC an 
alternative use of the disgorged monies. Called the “Fair Fund and 
Disgorgement Plan,” it provides that in lieu of being deposited in the U.S. 
Treasury, the funds may “become part of a disgorgement fund or other 
fund established for the benefit of the victims of such violation.”287 While 
the term “victim” as herein used is vague, it would at least conceptually 
appear to encompass a fairly broad category of persons whether U.S. or 
foreign, legal or natural.  
 
 
 279. Turk, supra note 274, at 45–50. 
 280. Paul R. Berger et al., Do FCPA Remedies Follow FCPA Wrongs? “Disgorgement” in 
Internal Controls and Books Records Cases, 3 FCPA UPDATE, Aug. 2011, at 1, 2, available at 
http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/9d56da80-1da1-4e29-bc27-4288643df3cc/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/ea922c2f-78d8-46ea-ad2d-69638418a04e/FCPAUpdateAugust2011.pdf. 
 281. Turk, supra note 274, at 46. 
 282. The Working Group gathers information concerning Member States’ compliance with the 
convention, which involves country visits by experts from peer governments and meetings with 
prosecutors and civil society representatives. OECD Working Group in International Business 
Transactions, OECD (2012), http://www.oecd.org/investment/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-bribery 
convention/oecdworkinggrouponbriberyininternationalbusinesstransactions.htm. See also Daniel K. 
Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 665, 679 (2004). 
 283. Turk, supra note 274, at 58–62. 
 284. Benjamin Kessler, Giving Back To The Victims, THE FCPA BLOG (May 2, 2012, 1:53 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/5/2/giving-back-to-the-victims.html (link to the letter from 
Robert S. Khuzami to Alexander W. Sierck included in blog post) (“We appreciate your thoughtful 
submission, and will give appropriate consideration to your suggestions.”). 
 285. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
429, §§ 202(a), 203, 104 Stat. 931 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), 78u-3(e) (2000)). Prior to 1990, 
the SEC’s disgorgement authority derived from case law. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., 
Inc., 547 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 286. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).  
 287. Penny Stock Act, 15 USC § 7246(a). 
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However, the current regulations interpreting this term prohibit 
returning disgorged profits to the victims, and in so doing illustrate the 
inherent limitations of SEC disgorgement.
288
 The SEC has interpreted 
“victim” in its regulations to refer exclusively to investors: where the 
original statute provides that the fund be established for “the benefit of the 
victims,” the regulation now reads “for the benefit of the investors.”289 
This approach is appropriate to securities law generally, in which the 
shareholders are typically the victims. But as other scholars have pointed 
out, investors in bribe-paying countries are not quite victimized by 
bribery; indeed, they typically profit from the ill-gotten gains, and are 
financially harmed only by the resulting enforcement action.
290
 Likely for 
this reason, the Fair Fund has not been used in FCPA enforcement.  
Although the regulation could in principle be amended to define 
victims more broadly, the regulation’s wording is merely reflective of the 
SEC’s broader mission, which is to “protect investors.”291 As the Supreme 
Court has recently emphasized, the SEC’s statutory authority extends only 
to U.S. markets and its investors.
292
 The principle that the securities laws 
should aim to improve the social conditions of the citizens in developing 
countries would have collateral implications for a great many areas of 
securities law; in effect, it would require redefining and reorganizing an 
agency. For this reason the disgorgement remedy, much like the victims 
rights strategy, is ill-suited to anti-bribery law. 
For a fully viable third option we can look to another area of federal 
law enforcement, environmental law, in which the proceeds of corporate 
enforcement actions are regularly used to compensate victims. As part of 
the settlement of an enforcement action with the EPA, violators may 
voluntarily agree to perform a project to benefit the environment.
293
 The 
cost of the project is then used to reduce the monetary penalty that would 
otherwise apply; the amount of penalty mitigation is based on the cost of 
 
 
 288. See Turk, supra note 274, at 16. 
 289. 17 C.F.R. § 201.1100 (2006). 
 290. See, e.g., David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of 
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and 
Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 478 (2009); Turk, supra note 274, at 18. 
 291. See generally The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov (follow 
“About Us” link) (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). 
 292. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 293. See Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEP) Policy, EPA.GOV (Oct. 4, 2010), 
http://www.epa.gov/region2/p2/sep.htm. 
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the project and several other factors.
294
 These projects are neither required 
nor prohibited by federal statute; they are solely the creatures of 
prosecutorial discretion. Neither do the victims go to court to compel this 
form of restitution; it is a voluntary agreement between the enforcement 
agencies, the defendant, and the organizations that will carry out the 
environmental project and thus receive the funds. In civil enforcement, 
these projects are called Supplemental Environmental Projects (“SEPs”), 
and on the criminal side, they are known as supplemental sentences or 
simply as community service.
295
  
This approach to settling federal enforcement actions recently reached 
its zenith in the case against BP for the Gulf of Mexico spill. Resulting in 
the single largest criminal resolution in U.S. history, with a $4.0 billion 
criminal recovery,
296
 the resolution is structured so that more than half of 
this recovery will fund SEPs to compensate those communities and 
ecosystems most directly harmed by the spill. As the government’s own 
press release explained, approximately $2.4 billion of the $4.0 billion 
criminal recovery is dedicated to acquiring, restoring, preserving and 
conserving—in consultation with appropriate state and other resource 
managers—the marine and coastal environments, ecosystems and bird and 
wildlife habitat in the Gulf of Mexico and bordering states harmed by the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. This portion of the criminal recovery will 
also be directed to significant barrier island restoration and/or river 
diversion off the coast of Louisiana to further benefit and improve coastal 
wetlands affected by the oil spill. An additional $350 million will be used 
to fund improved oil spill prevention and response efforts in the Gulf 
through research, development, education and training.
297
 The money is 
going primarily to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation that, 
contrary to its misleading name, is actually an independent, non-profit 
 
 
 294. These factors include: how effectively it benefited the public or the environment, whether it 
was innovative, what (if any) input exists from the affected community, and whether issues of 
environmental justice were relevant in a given case. Id.  
 295. Kris Dighe, Organizational Community Service in Environmental Crimes Cases, 60 U.S. 
ATTY’S BULL., July 2012, at 100, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/ 
usab6004.pdf. 
 296. Kiley Kroh, Breaking Down the BP Settlement: Where Will the Money Go?, 
THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Nov. 16, 2012, 9:19 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/11/16/120282/ 
breaking-down-the-bp-settlement-where-will-the-money-go/.  
 297. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead 
Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding 
Deepwater Horizon Incident (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/November/12-ag-
1369.html. 
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conservation group.
298
 An additional $350 million will go to the National 
Academy of Sciences for oil spill prevention, education, research, and 
training.
299
 In addition to the sheer size, this criminal settlement is historic 
in its dedication of the majority of funds to the affected communities for 
environmental restoration.
300
  
The environmental model could be easily adapted to the anti-bribery 
context to compensate victims. Supplemental sentences have historically 
been used for a wide array of purposes, including improving public health, 
preventing or reducing pollution, performing environmental restoration 
and protection, performing a self-assessment or audit to identify potential 
improvements to environmental performance, and providing training or 
technical support to other members of the community to improve 
environmental compliance. The EPA requires the project to improve, 
protect, or reduce risks to the environment or public health and that the 
project be closely connected to the violation.
301
 Similarly, as part of the 
terms of an FCPA settlement, the DOJ and SEC could require companies 
to set aside a substantial portion of the criminal penalties to fund local 
organizations. These organizations would use the funds to restore and 
protect the rights of the communities in which the bribes occurred. The 
particular uses of the funds would depend on the nature of the bribes. 
Where, for example, safety regulations were circumvented in the 
construction of public buildings, local organizations could fund and 
monitor safety assessments and improvements. Where public health 
officials were bribed, organizations could again fund and monitor 
inspections and remedial measures. Where environmental regulations were 
violated, these organizations could function similarly to those in the BP 
 
 
 298. Guilty Plea Agreement at 16, U.S. v. BP Exploration & Prod. Inc., Civ. Action No. 2:10-cv-
04536 (E.D. La. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/43320121115143613 
990027.pdf. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Kroh, supra note 296. Additional forms of restitution are anticipated. In June 2012, Congress 
took the unusual step of passing the RESTORE Act, which requires eighty percent of civil fines under 
the Clean Water Act to be used for community restoration in the Gulf States. While the Clean Water 
Act civil settlement has not yet been reached, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the DOJ 
will seek the maximum penalty, which could be as high as $21 billion. Kroh, supra note 296. 
Additionally, beyond the $4 billion criminal recovery, an additional “criminal fine” of $1.25 billion 
will be allocated to Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and North American Wetlands Conservation Fund 
pursuant to specific statutory sections. Criminal Guilty Plea, supra note 298, at 4.  
 301. Supplemental Environmental Project (SEPs) Library, EPA.GOV (May 9, 2014), http://www. 
epa.gov/region1/enforcement/sep/index.html. The EPA also requires that the SEP be voluntary; it 
cannot have been committed to or started before the EPA identified the violation; the EPA may not 
have any role in managing the SEP or its funding; the specific SEP must be memorialized in a signed 
agreement; and the SEP may not increase any federal agency’s resources to perform activities that are 
already legally required of those agencies. Id. 
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Gulf of Mexico settlement and fund environmental restoration and training 
for prevention. All such measures would plainly help to improve the 
conditions of those communities that were damaged by systemic corporate 
bribery and, in doing so, enable the FCPA to achieve its purpose of 
promoting and protecting rights. 
Indeed, there actually exists a little-known precedent in FCPA history 
for using monies collected from enforcement actions to fund local 
organizations in the host country. The enforcement action of 2002 that 
heralded the beginning of the modern enforcement era concerned James 
Giffen, a U.S. attorney who bribed officials in Kazakhstan on behalf of 
U.S. oil companies. In settling the case, the United States arranged with 
officials in Kazakhstan and Switzerland to release the $80 million in 
alleged bribes from their Swiss accounts and establish a trust fund.
302
 That 
fund now finances a Kazakh NGO called the BOTA Foundation, whose 
purpose is to “improve the lives of children, youth and their families 
suffering from poverty in Kazakhstan through investment in their health, 
education and social welfare.”303  
BOTA has three specific programs funded by the recovered bribes: a 
conditional cash transfer program, which gives funds directly to eligible 
poor families to increase access to health, education, and social welfare 
services; a social services program, with makes grants to local and 
international NGOs to promote early childhood development, special 
needs services, and benefits to orphans and other severely disadvantaged 
children; and a tuition assistance program, which provides college and 
vocational education scholarships.
304
 The fund’s board of trustees includes 
several Kazakhstani academics and professionals, and government 
representatives from the U.S. and Switzerland; it does not include any 
Kazakhstani government officials. The Giffen case is slightly different 
from what this Article proposes: BOTA is funded with recovered bribes, 
not with criminal penalties. Still, it may be understood as setting an 
important, if underappreciated, precedent: the recognition that bribery’s 
victims should, and can, be compensated through funding community 
organizations. 
While this Part has focused on the compensation of victims in 
developing countries, some have proposed compensating a second group 
 
 
 302. Michael Steen, Kazakh “Oil Bribe” Millions to Go to Poor Children, REUTERS (May 4, 
2007, 7:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/05/04/idUSL04489030.  
 303. See THE BOTA FOUND., http://www.bota.kz/en/index.php/pages/index/1 (last visited Aug. 21, 
2014). 
 304. Id. 
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of victims: compliant companies who lose business to bribe-payors from 
foreign jurisdictions. The environmental model could perhaps make some 
progress in this regard by funding local watchdog organizations who 
might conduct the kind of investigative reporting that exposed Wal-Mart, 
and expose the bribe paying of other companies. Such exposure works, 
however, only when the company’s home jurisdiction will enforce its 
extraterritorial bribery prohibitions. And at present, few do. A more 
effective long-term strategy would require some kind of legal mechanism, 
stronger than most foreign jurisdictions’ anti-bribery enforcement regimes, 
to hold foreign companies liable.  
A Democratic Congressman from Colorado has introduced a 
provocative bill
305
 in multiple congressional sessions that would create a 
private right of action under the FCPA. It grants the right to persons who 
are already subject to FCPA jurisdiction and proposes that these actions be 
brought only against persons who are not subject to FCPA jurisdiction. 
The bill states that only “foreign concerns” (a term that does not appear in 
the FCPA) may be liable, and defines a foreign concern as “any person 
other than” those subject to FCPA jurisdiction.306 The plaintiff would have 
to prove essentially three elements: (1) that the foreign person made a 
payment otherwise proscribed under the FCPA; (2) that the payment 
“prevented the plaintiff from obtaining or retaining business for or with 
any person; and (3) that the payment “assisted the foreign concern in 
obtaining or retaining business.”307 Damages would be three times either 
the value of the business that the defendant gained, by virtue of the bribe, 
or the value of the business that the plaintiff lost due to the bribe.
308
  
Whatever political opposition the bill may be encountering (it has 
never made it out of committee),
309
 it suffers from a more fundamental 
problem. It could not meaningfully address the business community’s 
basic objection to FCPA enforcement: the absence of a level playing 
 
 
 305. Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 3531, 112th Cong. (2011). See also 
Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2009, H.R. 2152, 111th Cong. (2009); Foreign Business 
Bribery prohibition Act of 2008, H.R. 6188, 110th Cong. (2008).  
 306. H.R. 3531, supra note 305, § 2. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. See H.R. 3531 Bill Summary & Status, THE LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR03531:@@@X (last visited Aug. 21, 2014); H.R. 2152 Bill Summary & 
Status, THE LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR02152:@@@X 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2014); H.R. 6188 Bill Summary & Status, THE LIBR. OF CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR06188:@@@X (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). 
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field.
310
 Private enforcement in U.S. courts, initiated by companies that 
could prove loss, and brought against only those foreign companies with 
sufficient ties to establish personal jurisdiction here, could never suffice to 
create an effective global anti-bribery enforcement regime. It could never 
neutralize the black knights. This problem could only be remedied by 
developing a mechanism for pressuring other capital-exporting nations to 
enforce their own laws. But that problem has arisen before, and we have 
begun developing ways to solve it. 
C. Pursuing Global Enforcement by Following the Precedent of 
Intellectual Property 
The most effective remedy to the black knight problem is precisely the 
remedy we sought to an analogous problem in intellectual property: an 
amendment to the World Trade Organization agreements. This Article 
proposes an anti-bribery amendment that would function exactly as the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement (“TRIPS”) 
functions now. We should begin with a caveat: this reform is quite plainly 
easier said than done. In the foreseeable future, the realistic chances of 
enacting the amendment I describe below are very nearly zero. But at the 
conceptual level, the idea has merit; as this Part will show, the parallels 
between intellectual property and anti-bribery law are striking. Intellectual 
Property and anti-bribery law have followed parallel historical trajectories, 
bringing anti-bribery to precisely the place now that IP was in the 1980s 
just prior to ratification of the WTO. Specifically, the current state of 
global anti-bribery enforcement, in which companies from non-enforcing 
countries are able to exploit the vulnerabilities of companies from IP-
enforcing nations, is precisely the problem that gave rise to TRIPS.  
The failures of the current U.S. approach to solving the black knight 
problem illustrate all too well why we must look elsewhere. The OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention of 1997
311
 obligates members to enforce FCPA-
type laws. Though it has made only incremental progress,
312
 criticizing the 
organization on these grounds is short-sighted; little steps are to be 
expected from a multinational organization. Rather, the OECD 
Convention suffers from two inherent problems that time is unlikely to 
 
 
 310. See, e.g., Regulations: Restoring Balance, USCHAMBER.COM, http://www.uschamber.com/ 
regulations (last visited Aug. 21, 2014). 
 311. OECD Convention, supra note 144.  
 312. OECD Progress Report, OECD.ORG (May 18, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/tax/harmfultax 
practices/43606256.pdf. 
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resolve. First, though OECD membership did at one time encompass all 
the major capital-exporters—the United States, the western European 
nations, and Japan, among others—this is no longer true. The recent rise of 
China, India, and the emerging economies generally renders the OECD 
worldview obsolete; many such countries, including China and India, are 
not members, and are not going to be. The OECD, then, is powerless to 
neutralize the black knights. But even if it could—even if the OECD were 
a worldwide organization that included all major capital-exporters—the 
convention would still suffer from a second, and probably fatal, flaw: it 
lacks a dispute mechanism. That is, compliant nations have no means of 
holding noncompliant nations accountable. Anti-bribery law thus cannot 
begin to become effective without two components: (1) enactment within 
an international organization that includes all major capital exporters; and 
(2) an effective interstate complaint procedure. 
While another existing convention can solve the membership problem, 
it cannot solve the dispute mechanism problem. The U.N.’s Convention 
Against Corruption (“UNCAC”)313 now has 160 parties, including all the 
major capital exporters, and specifically includes an international bribery 
prohibition.
314
 Though enacted ten years ago, it has had minimal impact on 
deterring international corporate bribery. Its standards are notoriously 
vague: contrary to the FCPA and OECD Convention which specifically 
define the prohibited conduct, UNCAC merely requires that each state 
“adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary” to stop 
bribery.
315
 This vagueness is likely the result of seeking consensus among 
160 parties in a convention that defines not just bribery (as the FCPA and 
OECD do) but all manner of corrupt acts, including such difficult-to-
define concepts as “trading in influence” or “abuse of functions.”316 But 
more fundamentally, UNCAC has no interstate complaint procedure. Even 
if its substantive requirements were sufficiently specific that 
noncompliance could be defined, imposing sanctions for noncompliance is 
virtually impossible.
317
  
 
 
 313. UNCAC, supra note 122. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. art. 15. 
 316. Id. art. 19. 
 317. One can imagine using the International Court of Justice as a dispute resolution mechanism 
for UNCAC. Because the ICJ requires both parties to a dispute to consent to the forum’s jurisdiction, 
nations could either consent ad hoc or UNCAC could be amended to establish compulsory jurisdiction 
in the ICJ. But until UNCAC defines the prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity that 
noncompliance could ever be identified, ICJ jurisdiction would do little good. The International 
Criminal Court might eventually be used to prosecute grand corruption, but it would likely require a 
showing that the corruption constituted a “crime against humanity,” a standard that few, if any, acts of 
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But history has already taught us how to address the problem through 
the development of intellectual property law. The U.S. intellectual 
property regime emerged in the late eighteenth and mid nineteenth 
centuries: the Patent Act
318
 and the Copyright Act
319
 were enacted in 1790, 
and the first federal trademark law
320
 came in 1870. These federal statutes 
were largely designed to afford domestic protections to U.S. persons for 
violations occurring within U.S. territory. They were gradually revised and 
expanded, and resources were increasingly devoted to their enforcement 
through the nineteenth century. But as the Industrial Revolution led to 
more worldwide economic and technological growth, competitor firms 
proliferated. Seeking to protect U.S. firms from overseas violations that 
were beyond the scope of existing domestic law, the U.S. became part of 
the movement that would result in the ratification of the first major 
international intellectual property convention: the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, enacted in 1883.
321
 The Convention 
created minimum substantive and procedural standards for the protection 
of various IP rights in patents, trademarks, trade names, and trade 
secrets.
322
 The Convention also created an organization of member nations 
called the Paris Union, which would meet periodically to discuss 
compliance with and amendments to the Convention. The Convention 
would spawn myriad other regional conventions to supplement its 
coverage, creating an overlapping network of international conventions 
designed to bring rival nations within a common IP legal regime.
323
 
 
 
corruption could satisfy. See, e.g., Mara Theophila, Note, “Moral Monsters” Under the Bed: Holding 
Corporations Accountable for Violations of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859 (2011). 
 318. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).  
 319. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
 320. Trademark Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198 (1870). 
 321. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 
1372, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter “Paris Convention”]. The U.S. was not among the original eleven 
signatories, but joined the Paris Convention four years later, in 1887. See L. Kamran Bilir et al., Do 
Treaties Encourage Technology Transfer? Evidence from the Paris Convention 1, 4 (Working Paper, 
July 22, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1893052. 
 322. These included patents, trademarks, trade names, and trade secrets. See Paris Convention, 
supra note 321, arts. 4–11. A separate convention, the Berne Convention, would cover copyrights. The 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 
[hereinafter “Berne Convention”]. Though enacted in 1886, the U.S. would not join the Berne 
Convention until 1989. Deborah Ross, Comment, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New 
Obligations for Authors’ Moral Rights?, 68 N.C. L. REV. 363, 363–65 (1990). 
 323. See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 
828 U.N.T.S. 389 (revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague 
on Nov. 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Nice on June 15, 1957, and at Stockholm on July 14, 
1967, and amended on Oct. 2, 1979); Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of 
Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, June 15, 1957, S. EXEC. DOC. E., 
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Despite the existence of the Paris Union, the Paris Convention created 
no transnational enforcement mechanism; it called on member nations to 
develop and implement their own domestic statutory protections.
324
 A 
decade of experience would demonstrate the inadequacy of this 
approach.
325
 Finding that local enforcement was uneven and unreliable, the 
developed countries concluded that they could no longer rely on domestic 
enforcement, even when supposedly required by international convention. 
Accordingly, they sought to create a supplemental international 
enforcement mechanism by which nations could be held accountable for 
their failure to uphold convention obligations. This concern became 
sufficiently pronounced in the early 1980s that the United States placed IP 
on the agenda for the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.
326
 The link 
between international trade and IP was not immediately obvious at that 
time; one scholar noted that it “calls for explanation” given that IP is 
nowhere mentioned in the WTO’s founding document, the GATT of 
1947.
327
 Still, a strong argument for the link between IP and trade, and 
aggressive lobbying efforts, eventually produced the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which entered 
into effect in 1995 along with the other WTO agreements.  
The substantive IP protections required by TRIPS are substantially 
similar to those of the predecessor Paris Convention; TRIPS calls for only 
slightly heightened protections.
328
 Moreover, TRIPS’ minimum standards 
do not require absolute uniformity across jurisdictions; for example, 
TRIPS allows the U.S. to continue using a first-to-invent criterion for 
priority in patent applications when the rest of the world uses a first-to-file 
system.
329
 But TRIPS’ most significant contribution to worldwide IP 
protection does not lie in the substantive standards. Rather, the 
contribution is two-fold. First, it requires all WTO members to meet 
minimum enforcement obligations. As one scholar noted, “it is [no longer] 
 
 
96-1, 1154 U.N.T.S. 89 (1979); World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty, 
Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M 65 (1997). 
 324. Paris Convention, supra note 321, art. 1. 
 325. See, e.g., Gustavo Bravo, From Paris Convention to TRIPs: A Brief History, 12 J. CONTEMP. 
ISSUES 445 (2001). 
 326. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND 
POLICY 697 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter MATSUSHITA]. 
 327. See id. at 696. For a critical view of the link between IP and trade, see R. Michael Gadbaw, 
Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or Marriage of Convenience?, 22 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 223 (1989). 
 328. MATSUSHITA, supra note 326, at 698. 
 329. Id. at 704. The United States has recently adopted the first to file system. See Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 257). 
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enough to enact laws protecting IP by minimum standards; WTO member 
states must enforce their laws” according to TRIPS’ requirements.330 But 
even that, standing alone, would be rather insignificant absent TRIPS’ 
second important contribution: the availability of the WTO dispute 
resolution process to states who wish to bring actions against other states 
for failure to uphold protection obligations.
331
 
This system, what one scholar calls “arguably the most important 
international tribunal,”332 functions much like an international court: 
jurisdiction is compulsory, disputes are resolved through application of 
settled rules of law, findings are appealable, decisions are binding on the 
parties, and non-compliance with settlements is sanctionable.
333
 TRIPS’ 
dispute resolution methods thus “put significant teeth” in national IP 
enforcement.
334
 The U.S. has brought multiple actions against China in 
particular.
335
 More generally, the procedure has become a mechanism in 
which WTO members, particularly the United States, have pressured 
China to more effectively enforce IP protections through imposing 
heightened criminal penalties, more aggressive civil and administrative 
enforcement, more equal treatment among domestic and foreign rights 
holders, etc.
336
 Though historically China was slow to respond to WTO 
pressures,
337
 commentators have noted a general upward trend in Chinese 
IP protections.
338
 
And today, IP rights are increasingly regarded as international human 
rights. Article 27 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states, “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
 
 
 330. AARON FELLMETH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 45 (2d ed. 
2009). 
 331. MATSUSHITA, supra note 326, at 734. 
 332. Id. at 104. 
 333. Id. 
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Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007); Request for 
Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution 
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2007). 
 336. See, e.g., Konstantina K. Athanasakou, China IPR Enforcement: Hard as Steel or Soft as 
Tofu? Bringing the Question to the WTO Under TRIPS, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 217 (2007). 
 337. Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China’s Capacity to Implement World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 399, 423 
(2002) (explaining that China’s failure to comply with the laws of the WTO may make dispute 
resolution impossible). 
 338. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, The Rise And Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 525 (2012); Natalie P. Stoianoff, The Influence of the WTO Over China’s 
Intellectual Property Regime, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 65 (2012). 
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interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author.”339 Similarly, the 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that,  
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits 
of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
340
 
United States anti-bribery law has followed a similar trajectory and 
should continue to follow it. At the time of enactment in 1977, the U.S. 
was not particularly concerned about rival industrialized nations; the 
United States still enjoyed substantial economic hegemony, and thus 
Congress unilaterally enacted a bribery prohibition without much regard 
for whether other countries would do so.
341
 But as competitors emerged in 
other countries, the United States recognized that it was losing business to 
companies whose countries did not enforce bribery prohibitions. Just as 
the United States participated in the creation of the Paris Convention and 
the Paris Group, the United States lobbied the developed countries through 
the OECD to implement and enforce similar laws.
342
 These laws were, by 
design, to be enforced as domestic law by national governments,
343
 just as 
IP laws were under the Paris Convention. The OECD convention created 
no international enforcement mechanism. Unsurprisingly, the empirical 
data would show that the OECD Convention has failed to level the 
proverbial playing field; many OECD nations fail to honor their 
obligations under the Anti-Bribery Convention and many other capital 
exporters are not parties to the convention. Anti-bribery law is thus now 
where IP once was: the need for global enforcement is plain, and 
experience has taught
344
 that this will not be achieved without an interstate 
complaint procedure. 
A TRIPS-like anti-bribery provision could establish standards of 
protection that are high, but that take into account differences between 
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countries on such fundamental legal issues as corporate criminal liability 
or the use of deferred prosecution agreements. It could also establish 
benchmarks of effective enforcement, as TRIPS does. But most 
importantly, it could subject the bribery provisions to the dispute 
settlement provisions, as TRIPS did. In doing so, it would create the first 
forum in which all capital exporters could bring complaints against other 
nations for failure to enforce extraterritorial bribery prohibitions. Creating 
an anti-bribery annex to the WTO agreements thus has unique potential to 
neutralize black knights. 
Moreover, anti-bribery law is substantially immune from the principal 
objection to TRIPS specifically and the global IP regime generally. While 
many argue that TRIPS benefits wealthy countries at the expense of 
developing countries, particularly in relation to pharmaceuticals,
345
 no 
such push back exists in anti-bribery law. Though developing countries 
fail to honor obligations by failing to enforce their anti-bribery statutes, 
they generally do not object to the international conventions at the level of 
principle. The dichotomy between the interests of wealthy nations and 
developing nations that now plagues IP law would, in the anti-bribery 
context, completely collapse. 
And we have long forgotten that a progression of this sort—starting 
with a U.S. statute, and then ultimately incorporating extraterritorial 
bribery prohibitions into the world trade regime to achieve global 
enforcement—was actually envisioned in the earliest days of U.S. 
deliberations. In 1975, two years before ultimate enactment of the FCPA, 
a resolution was introduced in the U.S. Senate calling for supplementing 
any U.S. statute with a multilateral agreement of some kind. The 
resolution stated that  
the [President’s] Special Representative for Trade Negotiations . . . 
and appropriate officials of the Departments of State, Commerce, 
the Treasury, . . . and Justice . . . initiate at once negotiations . . . 
with the intent of developing . . . specific trading obligations among 
governments, together with suitable procedures for the settlement of 
disputes, which would result in elimination of [bribery] on an 
international, multilateral basis, including suitable sanctions to cope 
with problems posed by nonparticipating nations, such codes and 
written obligations to become part of the international system of 
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rules and obligations within the framework of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
346
  
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), of course, is the 
precursor to the WTO. The resolution passed by a vote of 93–0. More 
specifically, President Ford’s Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Domestic and International Business, Travis Reed, was even more 
prescient. He proposed, specifically, introducing anti-bribery laws to the 
world’s capital exporters in two steps: first, through the OECD, which 
could start the process of achieving agreement among the capital exporters 
on the specific provisions of a global bribery provision, and once the 
contours of the appropriate legal regime had been worked out, it “could 
then be introduced into GATT.”347 But the proposal did not gain 
momentum in Congress, and admittedly, it would probably not gain 
momentum within the WTO today. 
Still, the parallels are striking. We have enacted a U.S. statute and, 
through the OECD, refined the template and introduced the statute to 
many of the world’s capital exporters. But just as the Ford Administration 
foresaw, we now need “suitable sanctions to cope with problems posed by 
nonparticipating nations” and “suitable procedures for the settlement of 
disputes.”348 The IP experience confirms our original hunch that the WTO 
can serve precisely this function. Moreover, the proposal would appeal to 
both sides of the political aisle, both here and abroad: liberals would 
herald the extension of our human rights regime, while conservatives 
would celebrate leveling the playing field. Conceptually, the idea’s time 
has come; perhaps one day it will come practically as well. 
CONCLUSION 
At a recent judicial conference, Chief Justice Roberts famously 
disparaged legal scholarship for its alleged irrelevance to practice. He 
remarked, “Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first 
article is likely to be . . . of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but 
[not] much help . . . to the bar.”349 But in his sympathy for the bar and 
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bench, the Chief Justice neglected to mention a third and arguably more 
important category: the actors whose conduct the law seeks to govern.  
Academics need not lament the contraction of the ATS; the majority of 
multinational corporations will scarcely notice the change at all. Rather, 
our efforts to construct a regime of corporate liability for overseas human 
rights violations are best refocused on the already-sound footing of anti-
bribery law. Reframed as an issue of human rights, anti-bribery can 
become that which Congress first expected it to be, and which the ATS 
might have been: an effective instrument for ensuring that multinational 
companies comply with, and promote, democratic values across the 
developing world. 
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